Storage or No Storage: Duopoly Competition Between Renewable Energy
  Suppliers in a Local Energy Market by Zhao, Dongwei et al.
1Storage or No Storage: Duopoly Competition
Between Renewable Energy Suppliers in a
Local Energy Market
Dongwei Zhao, Student Member, IEEE, Hao Wang, Member, IEEE,
Jianwei Huang, Fellow, IEEE, and Xiaojun Lin, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
Renewable energy generations and energy storage are playing increasingly important roles in serving
consumers in power systems. This paper studies the market competition between renewable energy
suppliers with or without energy storage in a local energy market. The storage investment brings the
benefits of stabilizing renewable energy suppliers’ outputs, but it also leads to substantial investment costs
as well as some surprising changes in the market outcome. To study the equilibrium decisions of storage
investment in the renewable energy suppliers’ competition, we model the interactions between suppliers
and consumers using a three-stage game-theoretic model. In Stage I, at the beginning of the investment
horizon (containing many days), suppliers decide whether to invest in storage. Once such decisions have
been made (once), in the day-ahead market of each day, suppliers decide on their bidding prices and
quantities in Stage II, based on which consumers decide the electricity quantity purchased from each
supplier in Stage III. In the real-time market, a supplier is penalized if his actual generation falls short of
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2his commitment. We characterize a price-quantity competition equilibrium of Stage II in the local energy
market, and we further characterize a storage-investment equilibrium in Stage I incorporating electricity-
selling revenue and storage cost. Counter-intuitively, we show that the uncertainty of renewable energy
without storage investment can lead to higher supplier profits compared with the stable generations with
storage investment due to the reduced market competition under random energy generation. Simulations
further illustrate results due to the market competition. For example, a higher penalty for not meeting
the commitment, a higher storage cost, or a lower consumer demand can sometimes increase a supplier’s
profit. We also show that although storage investment can increase a supplier ’s profit, the first-mover
supplier who invests in storage may benefit less than the free-rider competitor who chooses not to invest.
Index Terms
Local energy market, Renewable generation, Energy storage, Market competition, Market equilibrium
NOMENCLATURE
Acronyms
S1S1 the case where both suppliers invest in storage
S0S0 the case where neither supplier invests in storage
S1S0 the case where one supplier invests in storage and the other does not
Variables
ϕi storage investment decision of supplier i
pd,ti bidding price of supplier i at hour t of day d
yd,ti bidding quantity of supplier i at hour t of day d
xd,ti electricity quantity that consumers purchase from supplier i at hour t of day d
Random variables
Xd,ti generation amount of supplier i at hour t of day d
CDd,ti charge and discharge power of supplier i at hour t of day d
Parameters/constants
λ penalty price for the supply shortage
p¯ price cap for the bidding price
3Dd,t demand of consumers at hour t of day d
ci unit storage investment cost of supplier i over the investment horizon
κi scaling factor of supplier i
Si storage capacity of supplier i
Ci storage investment cost (scaled in one hour) of supplier i
Symbols of payoffs
piR,d,ti supplier i’s revenue at hour t of day d
piRE,d,ti supplier i’s equilibrium revenue at hour t of day d
piS1S1i supplier i’s expected equilibrium revenue in S1S1 case over the investment horizon
piS0S0i supplier i’s expected equilibrium revenue in S0S0 case over the investment horizon
pi
S1S0|Y




i without-storage supplier i’s expected equilibrium revenue in S1S0 case over the in-
vestment horizon
Πi supplier i’s profit over the investment horizon
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and motivation
Renewable energy, as a clean and sustainable energy source, is playing an increasingly impor-
tant role in power systems [2]. For example, from the year 2007 to 2017, the global installed
capacity of solar panels has increased from 8 Gigawatts to 402 Gigawatts, and the wind power
capacity has increased from 94 Gigawatts to 539 Gigawatts [2]. Compared with traditional larger-
scale generators, renewable energy sources can be more spatially distributed across the power
system, e.g., at the distribution level near residential consumers [2]. Due to the distributed nature
of renewable energy generations, there has been growing interest in forming local energy markets
for renewable energy suppliers and consumers to trade electricity at the distribution level [3]. Such
local energy markets will allow consumers to purchase electricity from the least costly sources
locally [4], and allow suppliers to compete in selling electricity directly to consumers (instead
of dealing with the utility companies).
4However, many types of renewable energy are inherently random, due to factors such as weather
conditions that are difficult to predict and control. Under current multi-settlement energy market
structures with day-ahead and real-time bidding rules (which are mostly designed for controllable
generations) [5], renewable energy suppliers face a severe disadvantage in the competition by
making forward commitment (in the day-ahead market) that they may not be able to deliver in
real time. For example, suppliers are often subject to a penalty cost if their real-time delivery
deviates from the commitment in the day-ahead market [6].
Energy storage has been considered as an important type of flexible resources for renewable
energy suppliers to stabilize their outputs [7]. Investing in storage can potentially improve the
renewable energy suppliers’ position in these energy markets. However, investing in storage
incurs substantial investment costs. Furthermore, the return of storage investment depends on the
outcome of the market, which in turn depends on how suppliers with or without storage compete
for the demand. Therefore, it remains an open problem regarding whether competing renewable
energy suppliers should invest in energy storage in the market competition and what economic
benefits the storage can bring to the suppliers.
B. Main results and contributions
In this paper, we formulate a three-stage game-theoretic model to study the market equilibrium
for both storage investment as well as price and quantity bidding of competing renewable energy
suppliers. In Stage I, at the beginning of the investment horizon, each supplier decides whether to
invest in storage. We formulate a storage-investment game between two suppliers in Stage I, which
is based on a bimatrix game to model suppliers’ storage-investment decisions for maximizing
profits [8]. Given the storage-investment decisions in Stage I, competing suppliers decide the
bidding price and bidding quantity in the (daily) local energy market in Stage II. We formulate
a price-quantity competition game between suppliers using the Bertrand-Edgeworth model [9]
(which models price competition with capacity constraints) in Stage II. Given suppliers’ bidding
strategies, consumers decide the electricity quantity purchased from each supplier in Stage III.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study the storage-investment equilibrium
between competing renewable energy suppliers in the two-settlement energy market. This problem
5is quite nontrivial due to the penalty cost on the random generations of a general probability
distribution.
By studying this three-stage model, we reveal a number of new and surprising insights that
are against the prevailing wisdom in the literature on the renewable energy suppliers’ revenues
in such a two-settlement market [6], [10] and on the economic benefits of storage supplementing
in renewable energy sources [11], [12].
• First, the uncertainty of the renewable generation can be favorable to suppliers. Note that the
prevailing wisdom is that storage investment (especially when the storage cost is low) will
improve suppliers’ revenue by stabilizing their outputs [11], [12]. In contrast, we find that
the opposite may be true when considering market competition. Specifically, without storage,
suppliers with random generations always have strictly positive revenues when facing any
positive consumer demand. However, if both suppliers invest in storage and stabilize their
renewable outputs, their revenues reduce to zero once the consumer demand is below a
threshold, which is due to the increased market competition after storage investment.
• Second, a higher penalty and a higher storage cost can also be favorable to the suppliers.
Note that the common wisdom is that a higher penalty [10] and a higher storage cost [11]
will decrease suppliers’ profit. However, when considering market competition, the opposite
may be true. With a higher penalty for not meeting the commitment, renewable energy
suppliers become more conservative in their bidding quantities, which can decrease market
competition and increase their profits. Furthermore, a higher storage cost may change one
supplier’s storage-investment decision, which can benefit the other supplier.
• Third, the first-mover supplier who invests in energy storage can be at the disadvantage
in terms of profit increase, which is contrary to the first-mover advantage gained by early
investment of resources or new technologies [13]. We find that although investing in storage
can increase one supplier’s profit, it may benefit himself less than his competitor (who does
not invest in storage). This is because the later mover becomes a free rider, who may benefit
from the changed price equilibrium in the energy market (due to the storage investment of
the other supplier) but does not need to bear the investment cost.
In addition to these surprising and new insights, a key technical contribution of our work
is the solution to the game-theoretic model for the price-quantity competition, which involves
6a general penalty cost due to random generations of a general probability distribution. Note
that such a price-quantity competition with the Bertrand-Edgeworth model has been studied in
literature under quite different conditions from ours. The works in [14]–[16] studied a general
competition between suppliers with strictly convex production costs. They focused on the analysis
of pure strategy equilibrium without characterizing the mixed strategy equilibrium. The study in
[17] characterized both pure and mixed strategy equilibrium between suppliers with deterministic
supply. However, this work considered zero cost related to the production (i.e., no production cost
or possible penalty cost). In electricity markets, the works in [18] and [19] also used Bertrand-
Edgeworth model to analyze the competition among renewable energy suppliers with random
generations. However, both [18] and [19] considered the suppliers’ electricity-selling competition
in a single-settlement energy market, and suppliers deliver random generations in real time. These
studies did not consider day-ahead bidding strategies and any deviation penalty cost. In particular,
the two-settlement markets with deviation penalty have been essential for ensuring the reliable
operation of power systems. Our work is the first to consider the two-settlement energy market,
characterizing both pure and mixed strategy equilibrium based on the Bertrand-Edgeworth model.
Such a setting is nontrivial due to the penalty cost caused by the suppliers’ random production
of a general probability distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the system model in
Section II, as well as the three-stage game-theoretic formulation between suppliers and consumers
in Section III. Then, we solve the three-stage problem through backward induction. We first
characterize the consumers’ optimal purchase decision of Stage III in Section IV. Then, we
characterize the price-quantity equilibrium of Stage II and the storage-investment equilibrium of
Stage I in Sections V and VI, respectively. We propose a probability-based method to compute
the storage capacity in Section VII. Furthermore, in Section IX, we extend some of the theoretical
results and insights from the duopoly case to the oligopoly case. Finally, we present the simulation
results in Section VIII and conclude this paper in Section X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a local energy market at the distribution level as shown in Figure 1. Consumers
can purchase energy from both the main grid and local renewable energy suppliers. To achieve a
7positive revenue, the renewable energy suppliers (simply called suppliers in the rest of the paper)
need to set their prices no greater than the grid price, and they will compete for the market
share. Furthermore, suppliers can choose to invest in energy storage to stabilize their renewable
outputs and reduce the uncertainty in their delivery. Next, we will introduce the detailed models








Fig. 1: System structure.
A. Timescale
We consider two timescales of decision-making. One is the investment horizonD={1, 2, ..., Ds}
of Ds days (e.g., Ds corresponding to the total number of days for the storage investment horizon).
Suppliers can decide (once) whether to invest in energy storage at the beginning of the investment
horizon. The investment horizon is divided into many operational horizons (many days), and each
d ∈ D corresponds to the daily operation of the energy market, consisting of many time slots
T ={1, 2, ..., T} (e.g., 24 hours of each day). In the day-ahead market on day d − 1, suppliers
decide the electricity price and quantity to consumers for each hour t ∈ T of the next day d ∈ D.
We will introduce the market structure in detail later in Section II.D.
B. Suppliers
In Sections IV-VI, we focus on the duopoly case of two suppliers in our analysis. Later in
Section IX, we further generalize to the oligopoly case with more than two suppliers. The reason
for focusing on the duopoly case is twofold. First, our work focuses on a local energy market
that is much smaller than a traditional wholesale energy market. The number of suppliers serving
8one local area is also expected to be limited [20], compared with thousands of suppliers in the
wholesale energy market [21]. In such a small local energy market, a few large suppliers may
dominate the market [22]. Second, we consider two suppliers for analytical tractability, which
is without losing key insights and can effectively capture the impact of competition among
suppliers considering the storage investment. For example, we show that in the duopoly case, the
uncertainty of renewable generation can be beneficial to suppliers. Such an insight is still valid
in the oligopoly case.
We denote I = {1, 2} as the set of two suppliers. For hour t of day d, the renewable output of
supplier i ∈ I is denoted as a random variable Xd,ti , which is bounded in [0, X¯d,ti ]. We assume
that the random generation Xd,ti has a continuous cumulative distribution function (CDF) F
d,t
i
with the probability density function (PDF) fd,ti . The distribution of wind or solar power can
be characterized using the historical data, which is known to the renewable energy suppliers.1
As renewables usually have extremely low marginal production costs compared with traditional
generators, we assume zero marginal production costs for the suppliers [18] [19].
C. Consumers
We consider the aggregate consumer population, and we denote the total consumer demand
at hour t of day d as Dd,t > 0. Note that consumers in one local area usually face the same
electricity price from the same utility. Thus, if the local market’s electricity price is lower than
the grid price, all the consumers will first purchase electricity from local suppliers. From the
perspective of suppliers, they only care about the total demand of consumers and how much
electricity they can sell to consumers.
Furthermore, our work conforms to the current energy market practice that suppliers make
decisions in the day-ahead market based on the predicted demand. Thus, for the demand Dd,t,
we consider it as a deterministic (predicted) demand in our model.2 Since the electricity demand
is usually inelastic [5], we also assume the following.
1In Section VIII of simulations, we use historical data to model the empirical CDF of renewable generations, which is explained
in detail in Appendix.XIV.
2The day-ahead prediction of consumers’ aggregated demand can be fairly accurate [24]. We assume that the demand and
supply mismatch due to the demand forecast error will be regulated by the operator in the real-time market.
9Assumption 1. Consumers’ demand is perfectly inelastic in the electricity price.
Consumers must purchase their demand Dd,t either from the main grid (at a fixed unit price Pg)
or from the local renewable suppliers (with prices to be discussed later).3
D. Two-settlement local energy market
We consider a two-settlement local energy market, which consists of a day-ahead market and a
real-time market [5]. In such an energy market, suppliers have market power and can strategically
decide their selling prices.4 Consumers have the flexibility to choose suppliers by comparing prices
[4]. We explain the two-settlement energy market in detail as follows.
• In the day-ahead market on day d− 1 (e.g., suppliers’ bids are cleared around 12:30pm of
day d − 1, one day ahead of the delivery day d [25]), supplier i ∈ I decides the bidding
price pd,ti and the bidding quantity y
d,t
i for each future hour t ∈ T of the delivery day d.
Based on suppliers’ bidding strategies, consumers decide the electricity quantity xd,ti (≤ yd,ti )
purchased from supplier i. Supplier i will get the revenue of pd,ti x
d,t
i in the day-ahead market
by committing the delivery quantity xd,ti to consumers. Thus, the day-ahead market is cleared
through matching supply and demand. Any excessive demand from the consumers will be
satisfied through energy purchase from the main grid.
• In the real-time market at each hour on the next day d, if supplier i’s actual generation




i ), he needs to pay the penalty
λ(xd,ti −Xd,ti ) in the real-time market, which is proportional to the shortfall with a unit penalty
price λ. For the consumers, although suppliers may not deliver the committed electricity to
them, the shortage part can be still satisfied by the system operator using reserve resources.
The cost of reserve resources can be covered by the penalty cost on the suppliers.
Note that the suppliers and consumers make decisions only in the day-ahead market. No active
decisions are made in the real-time market, but there may be penalty cost on the delivery shortage.
3We do not consider demand response for the consumers.
4This price model is different from the usual practice of the wholesale energy market, where the market usually sets a uniform
clearing price for all the suppliers through market clearing [5].
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To facilitate the analysis, we further make several assumptions of this local energy market
as follows. First, for the excessive amount of generations (i.e., xd,ti < X
d,t
i ), we assume the
following.
Assumption 2. Suppliers can curtail any excessive renewable energy generation (beyond any
specific given level).
Assumption 2 implies that we do not need to consider the possible penalty or reward on the
excessive renewable generations in real time.5
Second, the local energy market is much smaller compared with the wholesale energy market.
Thus, the suppliers are usually small and hence may focus on serving local consumers. It is less
likely for them to trade in the wholesale energy market. This is summarized in the following
assumption.
Assumption 3. Suppliers only participate in the local energy market and serve local consumers.
They do not participate in the wholesale energy market.
Third, for the bidding price pi and penalty price λ, we impose the following bounds.
Assumption 4. Each supplier i’s bidding price pi has a cap p¯ that satisfies pi ≤ p¯ < Pg.
Assumption 5. The penalty price satisfies λ > p¯.
Assumption 4 is without loss of generality, since no supplier will bid a price higher than Pg;
otherwise, consumers will purchase from the main grid.6 Assumption 5 ensures that the penalty
is high enough to discourage suppliers from bidding higher quantities beyond their capability.
Note that price cap p¯ and the penalty λ are exogenous fixed parameters in our model. Next, we
introduce how suppliers invest in the energy storage to stabilize their outputs.
5There are different policies to deal with the surplus feed-in energy of renewables. In some European countries, the energy
markets give rewards to the surplus energy [26]. In the US, some markets deal with the surplus energy using the real-time
imbalance price that can be either penalties or rewards [10].
6We avoid the case p¯ = Pg as it may bring ambiguity to the local energy market if the bidding price is equal to the main grid
price Pg , in which case it is not clear whether consumers purchase energy from the local energy market or from the main grid.
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E. Storage investment
Each supplier decides whether to invest in storage at the beginning of the investment horizon.
We denote supplier i’s storage-investment decision variable as ϕi, where ϕi = 1 means investing
in storage and ϕi = 0 means not investing. If supplier i invests in storage, we assume the
following.
Assumption 6. The with-storage supplier will utilize the storage to completely smooth out his
power output at the mean value of renewable generations.
Thus, supplier i with the renewable generation Xd,ti will charge and discharge his storage
7 to






i − E[Xd,ti ], (1)
where CDd,ti > 0 means charging the storage and CD
d,t
i < 0 means discharging the storage.
Note that EXd,ti [CD
d,t
i ] = 0, which implies the long-term average power that the suppliers need
to charge or discharge his storage is zero. Next, we introduce how to characterize the storage
capacity and the storage cost.
First, based on the charge and discharge random variable CDd,ti , we propose a simple yet
effective probability-based method to characterize the storage capacity Si using historical data
of renewable generation Xd,ti . In particular, we set a probability threshold, and then aim to find
a minimum storage capacity Si such that the energy level in the storage exceeds the capacity
with a probability no greater than the probability threshold. We will explain this methodology in
Section VII.
Second, we calculate the storage cost of suppliers over the investment horizon (scaled into one
hour) as Ci = ciκiSi, where ci is the unit capacity cost over the investment horizon and κi is the
scaling factor that scales the investment cost over years to one hour. The factor κi is calculated
as follows. We first calculate the present value of an annuity (a series of equal annual cash flows)
7There can be different ways to deal with the randomness of renewable generations, including the curtailment of renewable
energy and the use of additional fossil generators to provide additional energy. It is interesting to combine energy storage with
other mechanisms (such as renewable energy curtailment), which we will explore in the future work.
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with the annual interest rate ri (e.g., ri = 5%), and then we divide the annuity equally to each








where yi is the number of years over the investment horizon (e.g., yi = 15 for Li-ion battery that
can last for 15 years), and Yd is the total hours in one year (e.g., Yd = 365× 24).
Therefore, given the parameter ci and κi as well as the probability distribution of random gen-
eration, the storage capacity and storage cost can be regarded as the fixed values for the supplier
who invests in storage. Note that a higher storage capacity leads to a higher storage investment
cost, which can further affect the storage-investment decisions in the suppliers’ competition. Next,
in the Section III, we will introduce the three-stage model between suppliers and consumers in
detail.
III. THREE-STAGE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
We build a three-stage model between suppliers and consumers. In Stage I, at the beginning
of the investment horizon, each supplier decides whether to invest in storage. In the day-ahead
energy market, for each hour of the next day, suppliers decide the bidding prices and quantities
in Stage II, and consumers make the purchase decision in Stage III. Next, we first introduce the
types of renewable-generation distributions for computing suppliers’ electricity-selling revenues
over the investment horizon, and then we explain the three stages respectively in detail.
A. Type of renewable-generation distributions
We cluster the distribution of renewable generation into several types. Note that suppliers’
revenues depend on the distribution of renewable generations. We use historical data of renewable
energy to model the generation distribution. Specifically, for the renewable generations at hour t
of all the days over the investment horizon, we cluster the empirical distribution into M types,
e.g., M = 12 for 12 months considering the seasonal effect. In this case, each type m ∈ M =
{1, 2, . . . ,M} occurs with a probability ρm = 1
12
considering 12 months.8 We use the data of
renewable energy of all days in month m at hour t to approximate the distribution of renewable
8There can be other types of clustering with unequal probabilities.
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Fig. 2: Three-stage model.
generation at hour t for all the days in this month m. Then, to study the interactions between
consumers and suppliers in the local energy market, we will assume that the renewable generation
of day d follows a random type (month) m, uniformly chosen from m ∈ M. For notation
convenience, we replace all the superscripts d, t into m, t.
B. The three-stage model
We illustrate the three-stage model between suppliers and consumers in Figure 2.
• Stage I: at the beginning of the investment horizon, each supplier i ∈ {1, 2} decides the
storage-investment decisions ϕi ∈ {0, 1}.
• Stage II: in the day-ahead market, for each hour t of the next day, each supplier i decides his
bidding price pm,ti and bidding quantity y
m,t
i based on suppliers’ storage-investment decisions,
assuming that the renewable-generation distribution is of month m.
• Stage III: in the day-ahead market, for each hour t of the next day, consumers decide the
electricity quantity xm,ti purchased from each supplier i based on each supplier’s bidding
price and quantity, assuming that the renewable-generation distribution is of month m.
This three-stage problem is a dynamic game. The solution concept of a dynamic game is
known as Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, which can be derived through backward induction [28].
Therefore, in the following, we will explain the three stages in detail in the order of Stage III,
Stage II, and Stage I, respectively.
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1) Stage III: At hour t of month m, given the bidding price (pm,t1 , p
m,t
2 ) and bidding quantity
(ym,t1 , y
m,t





purchased from supplier 1 and supplier 2, respectively. The objective of consumers is to maximize
the cost saving of purchasing energy from local suppliers compared with purchasing from the





2 ) = (Pg − pm,t1 )xm,t1 + (Pg − pm,t2 )xm,t2 . (3)
Recall that we model the collective purchase decision of the entire consumer population together.
Consumers must satisfy their demand either from the local energy market or from the main grid
(at the fixed price Pg). The total cost of satisfying the entire demand by the main grid is fixed.
Therefore, minimizing the total energy cost is equivalent to maximizing the cost savings in the
local energy market. We present consumers’ optimal purchase problem as follows.





(Pg − pm,t1 )xm,t1 + (Pg − pm,t2 )xm,t2 , (4a)
s.t. xm,t1 + x
m,t
2 ≤ Dm,t, (4b)
0 ≤ xm,ti ≤ ym,ti , i = 1, 2. (4c)
Constraint (4b) states that the total purchased quantity xm,t1 + x
m,t
2 is no greater than the demand
Dm,t. Constraints (4c) states that the quantity purchased from supplier i is no greater than
his bidding quantity ym,ti . This problem is a linear programming and can be easily solved,
which we show in Section IV. We denote the optimal solution to Problem (4) as a function
of suppliers’ bidding prices and quantities (pm,t,ym,t), i.e., xm,t∗i (p
m,t,ym,t), ∀i = 1, 2, where
pm,t = (pm,t1 , p
m,t
2 ) and y
m,t = (ym,t1 , y
m,t
2 ).
2) Stage II: Given the storage-investment decision ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) in Stage I, both suppliers
decide the bidding price pm,t and bidding quantity ym,t to maximize their revenues in Stage
II. We denote supplier i’s electricity-selling revenue as piR,m,ti , which consists of two parts: the
commitment revenue pm,ti x
m,t∗
i (p
m,t,ym,t) from committing the delivery quantity in the day-ahead
market, and the penalty cost in the real-time market. Supplier i who invests in storage (i.e.,
ϕi = 1) will be penalized if the committed quantity x
m,t∗
i (p
m,t,ym,t) is larger than his stable
generation E[Xm,ti ]. Supplier i who does not invest in storage (i.e., ϕi = 0) will be penalized if
the commitment xm,t∗i (p
m,t,ym,t) is larger than his actual random generation Xm,ti .
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Note that the decisions of two suppliers are coupled with each other. If one supplier bids a
lower quantity or a higher price, it is highly possible that consumers will purchase more electricity
from the other supplier. We formulate a price-quantity competition game between suppliers given
storage-investment decisions ϕ as follows.
Stage II: Price-quantity competition game
• Players: supplier i ∈ {1, 2}.
• Strategies: bidding quantity ym,ti ≥ 0 and bidding price pm,ti ∈ [0, p¯] of each supplier i.













m,t,ym,t)− λ(xm,t∗i (pm,t,ym,t)− E[Xm,ti ])+,










if ϕi = 0,
(5)
where we define (g)+ = max(g, 0).
If both suppliers invest in storage (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 2), the equilibrium has been characterized in
[17]. However, if there is at least one supplier who does not invest in storage (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi ≤ 1),
characterizing the equilibrium is quite non-trivial due to the penalty cost on the random generation
of a general probability distribution. We will discuss how to characterize the equilibrium in detail
in Section V. We denote the equilibrium revenue of supplier i as piRE,m,ti (ϕ).
3) Stage I: At the beginning of the investment horizon, each supplier decides whether to invest
in storage to maximize his expected profit. We denote supplier i’s expected profit as Πi, which
incorporates the expected revenue in the local energy market and the possible storage investment
cost. As one supplier varies his storage-investment decisions, it leads to a different price-quantity
subgame, which will affect both suppliers’ profits. Thus, suppliers’ storage-investment decisions
are coupled and we formulate a storage-investment game between suppliers as follows.
Stage I: Storage-investment game
• Players: supplier i ∈ {1, 2}.
• Strategies: whether investing in storage ϕi ∈ {0, 1}.
• Payoffs: supplier i’s expected profit (scaled in one hour) is
16
Πi (ϕ) = Em,t[piRE,m,ti (ϕ)]− ϕiCi. (6)
This storage-investment game is a 2× 2 bimatrix game where each supplier has two strategies.
Although the Nash equilibrium of 2 × 2 bimatrix game can be easily solved numerically, the
close-form equilibrium does not exist in all subgames of Stage II. It is challenging to analyze
the storage-investment equilibrium with respect to the parameters, e.g., demand and storage cost,
and we discuss it in detail in Section VI.
We solve this three-stage problem through backward induction. We first analyze the solution
in Stage III given the bidding prices and bidding quantities in Stage II. Then, we incorporate the
solution in Stage III to analyze the price and quantity equilibrium in Stage II, given (arbitrary)
storage-investment decisions in Stage I. Finally, we incorporate the equilibrium of Stage II into
Stage I to solve the storage-investment equilibrium. In the next three sections of Section IV,
Section V, and Section VI, we will analyze the three stages in the order of Stage III, Stage II,
and Stage I, respectively.
IV. SOLUTION OF STAGE III
In this section, we characterize consumers’ optimal purchase solution to Problem (4) in Stage
III. We use subscript i ∈ {1, 2} to denote supplier i and we use −i to denote the other supplier.
Note that in Stage III, the decisions are made independently for each hour of each day. For
notation simplicity, we omit the superscript m, t in the corresponding variables and parameters.
Given the bidding price p and bidding quantity y of suppliers, we characterize in Proposition 1
consumers’ optimal decision x∗(p,y) = (x∗i (p,y), i = 1, 2) in Stage III. Recall that we assume
that the bidding price in the local energy market is lower than the main grid price (i.e., p¯ < Pg).
Proposition 1 (optimal purchase x∗(p,y) in Stage III).
• If pi < p−i for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then x∗i (p,y) = min (D, yi) and x∗−i(p,y) = min (D −min (D, yi) , y−i) .
• If p1 = p2, then the optimal purchase solution can be any element in the following set.
X opt = {x∗(p,y) :
2∑
i=1




0 ≤ xi ≤ yi, i = 1, 2}.
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We assume that the demand will be allocated to the suppliers according to the condition
either p1 < p2 or p2 < p1. The condition p1 < p2 or p2 < p1 is selected based on maximizing
the two suppliers’ total revenue.9
Proposition 1 shows that the consumers will first purchase the electricity from the supplier
who sets a lower price. If there is remaining demand, then they will purchase from the other
supplier. Furthermore, if consumers’ demand cannot be fully satisfied by the local suppliers, they
will purchase the remaining demand from the main grid. We show the proof of Proposition 1 in
Appendix.XV. Next we analyze the strategic bidding of suppliers in Stage II by incorporating
consumers’ optimal purchase decisions x∗(p,y).
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF STAGE II
In this section, we will characterize the bidding strategies of suppliers for the price-quantity
competition subgame in Stage II, given the storage-investment decision in Stage I. Note that,
depending on the storage-investment decisions in Stage I, there are three types of subgames: (i) the
both-investing-storage (S1S1) case, (ii) the mixed-investing-storage (S1S0) case, where one invests
in storage and one does not, and (iii) the neither-investing-storage (S0S0) case. The competition-
equilibrium characterization between suppliers is highly non-trivial, due to the general distribution
of renewable generations and the penalty cost. In particular, the pure price equilibrium may not
exist, which requires the characterization of the mixed price equilibrium. Next, we first show
that each supplier’s equilibrium bidding quantity is actually a weakly dominant strategy that does
not depend on the other supplier’s decision, based on which we further derive the suppliers’
bidding prices at the equilibrium for each subgame. Note that in Stage II, the decisions are made
independently for each hour of each day. For notation simplicity, we omit the superscript m, t in
the corresponding variables and parameters.
A. Weakly-dominant strategy for bidding quantity
We show that given the bidding price p, each supplier has a weakly dominant strategy for the
bidding quantity that does not depend on the other supplier’s quantity or price choice. This is
9If there is no difference between p1 < p2 and p2 < p1, the demand will be allocated by either p1 < p2 or p2 < p1 with
equal probabilities.
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rather surprising, and it will help reduce the two-dimensional bidding process (involving both
quantity and price) into a one-dimensional bidding process (involving only price). Deriving the
weakly dominant strategy is nontrivial due to the penalty cost on the renewable generation of a
general probability distribution faced by the without-storage supplier.
We first define the weakly dominant strategy for the bidding quantity y∗i in Definition 1, which
enables a supplier to obtain a revenue at least as high as any other bidding quantity yi, no matter
what is the other supplier’s decision.
Definition 1 (weakly dominant strategy). Given price p and storage-investment decision ϕ, a





i , y−i)),ϕ) ≥ piRi (pi, x∗i (p, (yi, y−i)),ϕ),
for any y−i and yi 6= y∗i .
We then characterize suppliers’ weakly dominant strategy y∗(p,ϕ) for the bidding quantity in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (weakly dominant strategy for the bidding quantity). The weakly dominant strategy
y∗(p,ϕ) is given by
y∗i (pi, ϕi) =






, if ϕi = 0,
(7)
where F−1i is the inverse function of the CDF Fi of supplier i’s random generation.
Theorem 1 shows that a with-storage supplier i (i.e., ϕi = 1) should bid the quantity at the
stable production level E[Xi] (independent of price p) so that he can attract the most demand
but do not face any penalty risk in the real-time market. For a without-storage supplier i (i.e.,
ϕi = 0), however, he has to trade off between his bidding quantity and the penalty cost incurred
by the random generation. His weakly dominant strategy y∗i (pi, ϕi) depends on his own bidding
price pi, but does not depend on the other supplier −i’s bidding price p−i or bidding quantity
y−i. Note that when price pi = 0, the bidding quantity y∗i (0, ϕi)=F
−1
i (0)=0. Furthermore, the
bidding quantity y∗i (pi, ϕi) increases in price pi, which shows that the without-storage supplier i
should bid more quantities when he bids a higher price. When price pi= p¯, the bidding quantity







<X¯i (i.e., the maximum generation amount) since we assume p¯ <λ.
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B. Equilibrium price-bidding strategy: pure equilibrium
We will further analyze the price equilibrium between suppliers based on the weakly dominant
strategies for the bidding quantities in Theorem 1. We characterize the price equilibrium with
respect to the demand that can affect the competition level between suppliers. For the S1S0 and
S0S0 cases, we show that a pure price equilibrium exists when the demand D is higher than a
threshold (characterized in the later analysis). However, when the demand D is lower than the
threshold, there exists no pure price equilibrium due to the competition for the limited demand.
For the S1S1 case, the equilibrium structure is characterized by two thresholds of the demand
(characterized in the later analysis). A pure price equilibrium will exist when the demand D is
higher than the larger threshold or lower than the other smaller threshold. However, when the
demand D is in the middle of the two thresholds, there exists no pure price equilibrium.
We first define the pure price equilibrium of suppliers in Definition 2, where no supplier can
increase his revenue through unilateral price deviation.
Definition 2 (pure price equilibrium). Given the storage-investment decision ϕ, a price vector





















for all 0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯, where y∗ is the weakly dominant strategies derived in Theorem 1.
Then, we show the existence of the pure price equilibrium in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (existence of the pure price equilibrium).
• Subgames of type S1S0 and type S0S0 (i.e., when
∑
i ϕi < 2):
– If D ≥ ∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi), there exists a pure price equilibrium p∗i = p¯, with equilibrium
revenue piREi = λ
∫ F−1i (p¯/λ)
0
xfi(x)dx, for any i = 1, 2.




i (p¯, ϕi), there is no pure price equilibrium.
• Subgame of type S1S1 (
∑
i ϕi = 2):
– If D ≥ ∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi), there exists a pure price equilibrium p∗i = p¯, with equilibrium
revenue piREi = p¯E[Xi], for any i = 1, 2.
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– If D ≤ mini y∗i (p¯, ϕi), there exists a pure price equilibrium p∗i = 0, with equilibrium
revenue piREi = 0, for any i = 1, 2.




i (pi, ϕi), there is no pure price equilibrium.
We summarize the existence of pure price equilibrium and the weakly dominant strategy of





Existence of pure price
equilibrium
Non-existence of pure price
equilibrium
S1S1 y∗i (pi, ϕi),
∀i = 1, 2
(a) D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi): p∗i = p¯,
∀i = 1, 2 (b)
D ≤ mini y∗i (p¯, ϕi): p∗i = 0,
∀i = 1, 2
mini y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi) < D <∑
i y
∗





∀i = 1, 2
D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi): p∗i = p¯,
∀i = 1, 2.




i (p¯, ϕi): no
pure price equilibrium
TABLE I: Weakly dominant strategy of bidding quantity as well as the conditions for the existence
of pure price equilibrium.
According to Proposition 2, for all the types of subgames, when the demand D is higher
than the summation of the suppliers’ maximum bidding quantities (i.e., D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi)), both
suppliers will bid the highest price p¯. The reason is that both suppliers’ bidding quantities will
be fully sold out in this case, and the highest price will give the highest revenue to each supplier.
Basically there is no impact of market competition in this case. However, for the S1S0 and S0S0




i (p¯, ϕi), there exists no pure price
equilibrium. In contrast, for the S1S1 subgame, it is also possible that when the demand D is
smaller than a threshold (i.e., D < mini y∗i (p¯, ϕi)), both suppliers have to bid zero price and
get zero revenue. The intuition is that the competition level of the S1S1 subgame is higher than
that of the S1S0 and S0S0 subgames due to both suppliers’ stable outputs, which leads to zero
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bidding prices if the demand is low. The result of the subagame S1S1 has been proved in [17].
We present the proofs of subgames of type S1S0 and type S0S0 in Appendix.XVI.
C. Equilibrium price-bidding strategy: mixed equilibrium
When the demand is such a level that there is no pure price equilibrium as shown in Proposition
2, we characterize the mixed price equilibrium between suppliers.
First, we define the mixed price equilibrium under the weakly dominant strategy y∗(p,ϕ) in
Definition 3, where µ denotes a probability measure10 of the price over [0, p¯] [17].
Definition 3 (mixed price equilibrium). A vector of probability measures (µ∗1, µ∗2) is a mixed




















for any measure µi.
Definition 3 states that the expected revenue of supplier i cannot be increased if he unilaterally
deviates from the mixed equilibrium price strategy µ∗i . Let F
e
i denote the CDF of µ
∗
i , i.e., F
e
i (pi) =
µ∗i ({p ≤ pi}). Let ui and li denote the upper support and lower support of the mixed price
equilibrium µ∗i , respectively, i.e., ui = inf{pi : F ei (pi) = 1} and li = sup{pi : F ei (pi) = 0}. To
characterize the mixed price equilibrium, we need to fully characterize the CDF function F ei
(including ui and li) for each i ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, we show that the mixed price equilibrium exists for each type of subgames and char-
acterize some properties of the mixed price equilibrium in Lemma 1. Lemma 1 can be derived
following the same method for the S1S1 case in [17]. Later, we discuss how to compute the
mixed price equilibrium of the S1S1, S1S0, and S0S0 cases, respectively.
Lemma 1 (characterization of the mixed price equilibrium). For any pair (ϕi, ϕ−i), when the
demand D falls in the range where no pure price equilibrium exists as shown in Proposition 2,
the mixed price equilibrium exists and has properties as follows.
10A probability measure is a real-valued function that assigns a probability to each event in a probability space.
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(i) Both suppliers have the same lower support and the same upper support:
l1 = l2 = l > 0, u1 = u2 = p¯. (9)
(ii) The equilibrium electricity-selling revenues piREi satisfy:





(iii) For any i = 1, 2, F ei is strictly increasing over [l, p¯], and has no atoms
11 over [l, p¯). Also,
F ei cannot have atoms at p¯ for both i = 1, 2.
Lemma 1 shows that both suppliers’ mixed-price-equilibrium strategies have the same support
and have continuous CDFs over [l, p¯). Based on Lemma 1, we next characterize the mixed price
equilibrium for the subgames of each type S1S1, S1S0, and S0S0.
1) S1S1 subgame (i.e.,
∑
ϕi = 2): As shown in Proposition 2, when the demand satisfies
mini y
∗




i (p¯, ϕi), there is no pure price equilibrium. We can characterize
a close-form equilibrium revenue for each supplier at the mixed price equilibrium, which has
been proved in [17]. Furthermore, under the mixed price equilibrium, both suppliers get strictly
positive revenues, while they may get zero revenues under the pure price equilibrium as shown
in Proposition 2. We show the close-form equilibrium revenue in Appendix.XI.
2) S1S0 subgame (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 1): In the S1S0 subgame, a mixed price equilibrium arises when




i (p¯, ϕi). However, we cannot characterize a close-form equilibrium revenue, as in
the S1S1 case due to the penalty cost on the general renewable generations for the without-storage
supplier. Instead, we can first characterize the CDF of the mixed price equilibrium assuming the
lower support l in Theorem 2, and then show how to compute the lower support l in Proposition
3. We present the proofs in Appendix.XVI.
Theorem 2 (S1S0: CDF of the mixed price equilibrium). In the S1S0 subgame (i.e.,
∑
i ϕ1 = 1),




i (p¯, ϕi), suppose that the common lower support l1 = l2 = l of the
mixed price equilibrium is known. Then, the suppliers’ mixed equilibrium price strategies are
characterized by the following CDF F ei :
• If ϕi = 1, we have













,ϕ)− piR−i(p, (D − E[Xi])+,ϕ)
. (11)
11The atom at p means that the left-limit of CDF at p satisfies F ei (p
−) , limp′↑p F ei (p′) < F ei (p).
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• If ϕi = 0, we have




p2 ·min (y∗i (p, ϕi), D)− p2 · (D − E[X−i])+
dp. (12)
for any l ≤ p < p¯.
As shown in Theorem 2, supplier i’s mixed strategy F ei is coupled with the other supplier’s
equilibrium revenue piRE−i . Next, we will explain how to compute the lower support l. Toward this
end, in (11) and (12), we replace the equilibrium lower support l by a variable l†i , and replace
F ei (p) by F
e
i (p | l†i ) to emphasize that F ei (p | l†i ) is a function of l†i . Lemma 1 (iii) implies
that there exists a solution l†i to the equation F
e
i (p¯
− | l†i ) = 1 for at least one of the suppliers.
Furthermore, we can prove that F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) decreases in l†i , and hence the solution (in l†i ) to
F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) = 1 is unique. Then, we can compute the lower support l in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (S1S0: computing the lower support l). Based on the solution l†i such that F ei (p¯− |
l†i ) = 1, ∀i = 1, 2, we consider two cases and compute the lower support l as follows.
1) If F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) = 1 has a solution l†i for both suppliers, then the equilibrium lower support
is l = maxi(l
†
i ).
2) If F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) = 1 has a solution l†i for only one supplier i, we have this unique solution
l†i as the equilibrium lower support l.
Through Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, we can compute the lower support and suppliers’
equilibrium revenues. Although we cannot obtain a close-form equilibrium revenue, in Theorem
3, we can show that in the S1S0 subgame, if two suppliers’ random generations have the same
mean value, then the with-storage supplier’s equilibrium revenue is always strictly higher than
that of the without-storage supplier.
Theorem 3 (S1S0: revenue comparison). If ϕi = 1, ϕ−i = 0 and E[Xi] = E[X−i], then
piREi (ϕ) > pi
RE
−i (ϕ) for both pure and mixed price equilibrium. Particularly, if X−i follows a





2, if 0 < D ≤ E[Xi],
4, if D = E[Xi],
λ
p¯
, if D > E[Xi].
(13)
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Theorem 3 shows the dominance of the with-storage supplier in the S1S0 subgame, whose
electricity-selling revenue can be much higher than that of the without-storage supplier. The
intuition is that the random generation makes the without-storage supplier at the disadvantage
in the market (due to the penalty cost). This suggests potential economic benefits of storage
investment for the supplier.12 However, investing in storage does not always bring benefits. If
both suppliers invest in storage, it may reduce both suppliers’ revenues compared with the case
that at least one supplier does not invest in storage. We will discuss it later in Proposition 5.
3) S0S0 subgame (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 0): In the S0S0 case, both suppliers do not invest in storage




i (p¯, ϕi), for the mixed price equilibrium, we can
neither obtain the close-form equilibrium revenue as in the S1S1 case nor obtain the equilibrium
strategy CDF as in Theorem 2 of the S1S0 case. Note that in the S1S1 and S1S0 subgames, at
least one supplier is not subject to the penalty cost, which makes it possible to characterize the
equilibrium strategy CDF or even close-form equilibrium revenue. In this S0S0 subgame, we will
characterize a range of the lower support l in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (S0S0: lower support). In the S0S0 subgame (i.e.,
∑
i ϕ1 = 0), when 0 < D <∑
i y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi), the lower support l of the mixed price equilibrium satisfies
min
i
y∗i (l, ϕi) < D ≤
∑
i
y∗i (l, ϕi) and l < p¯. (14)
The bidding quantity y∗i (l, ϕi) is the minimal bidding quantity of supplier i when he uses the
mixed price strategy. Proposition 4 shows that this minimal bidding quantity cannot be too lower
or too higher for both suppliers.
Note that the mixed price equilibrium has a continuous CDF over [l, p¯) shown in Lemma 1,
but we cannot derive it in close form. To have a better understanding of the CDF, we discretize
the price to approximate the original continuous price set, and compute the mixed equilibrium
for the discrete price set. The details are shown in Appendix.XII.
12Note that Theorem 3 only compares the revenue of the two suppliers. When considering the storage investment cost in Stage
I and comparing the suppliers’ profit, we will have some surprising results shown in Section VI and Section VIII.
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D. Strictly positive revenue in the S1S0 and S0S0 subgames
Analyzing the equilibrium revenues of the three types of subgames, we show in Proposition 5
that in the S1S0 and S0S0 subgames, both suppliers always get strictly positive revenues.
Proposition 5 (strictly positive revenue with randomness). In the S1S0 and S0S0 subgames, each
supplier i always gets strictly positive revenue at (both pure and mixed) equilibrium, i.e., piREi > 0.
This result is counter-intuitive for the following reason. Recall that in the S1S1 subgame, both
suppliers can get zero revenue if the demand is below a threshold as shown in Proposition 2. The
common wisdom is that when the generation is random, the revenues of suppliers tend to be low
due to the penalty cost. In contrast, Proposition 5 shows that the suppliers’ revenues are always
strictly positive when the generation is random. Thus, the randomness can in fact be beneficial.
The underlying reason should be understood from the point of view of market competition. The
randomness makes suppliers bid more conservatively in their bidding quantities, which leads to
less-fierce market competition and thus increases their revenues.
VI. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF STAGE I
In Stage I, each supplier i has two strategies: (i) investing in storage, i.e., ϕi = 1, and (ii) not
investing storage, i.e., ϕi = 0, which leads to a bimatrix game. For this bimatrix game, we can
analyze the equilibrium strategy by simply comparing the profits for each strategy pair of the
two suppliers. Note that while the electricity-selling revenue is given in the results of Section
V, the profit also depends on the storage cost. To calculate the storage investment cost, we also
propose a probability-based method using real data to characterize the storage capacity for the
with-storage supplier in Section VII.
Each supplier’s profit can be calculated by taking the expectation of the equilibrium revenue in
the local energy market at each hour, and subtracting storage investment cost over the investment
horizon (scaled into one hour). Note that suppliers’ storage-investment strategy pairs ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2)
lead to four possible subgames: S1S1 subgame (i.e.
∑
i ϕi = 2), S1S0 subgame (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 1,
including two cases: (ϕ1, ϕ2) = (1, 0) and (ϕ1, ϕ2) = (0, 1)), and S0S0 subgame (i.e.
∑
i ϕi = 0).
Taking the expectation of equilibrium revenue over all the hours in the investment horizon, we




respectively. For the S1S0 subgame, we denote the with-storage and without-storage supplier i’s
equilibrium revenue as piS1S0|Yi and pi
S1S0|N
i , respectively. For illustration, we list the profit table
with all four strategy pairs in Table II.
Supplier 2: invest Supplier 2: not invest
Supplier 1: invest (piS1S11 −C1, piS1S12 −C2) (piS1S0|Y1 − C1, piS1S0|N2 )
Supplier 1: not invest (piS1S0|N1 , pi
S1S0|Y
2 − C2) (piS0S01 , piS0S02 )
TABLE II: Supplier’s profits under different ϕ.
Next, we will first derive the conditions for each storage-investment strategy pair to be an
equilibrium, respectively. Then, we analyze the equilibrium with respect to the parameters of
storage cost and demand. Finally, we show that both suppliers can get strictly positive profits in
this storage-investment game.
A. Conditions of pure storage-investment equilibrium
We will characterize the conditions on the storage cost and the subgame equilibrium revenue
for each strategy pair to become an equilibrium, respectively.
First, we define the pure storage-investment equilibrium in Definition 4, which states that neither
supplier has an incentive to deviate from his storage-investment decision at the equilibrium.
Definition 4 (pure storage-investment equilibrium). A storage-investment vector ϕ∗ is a pure





) ≥ Πi (ϕi, ϕ∗−i) , for any ϕi 6=
ϕ∗i , and any i = 1, 2.
Based on Definition 4, we characterize the conditions on the storage cost and the subgame
equilibrium revenue for the storage-investment pure equilibrium in Theorem 4, the proof of which
is presented in Appendix.XVII.
Theorem 4 (conditions of pure storage-investment equilibrium).
• S0S0 case is an equilibrium if Ci ∈ [piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i ,+∞), for both i = 1, 2.
• S1S0 case is an equilibrium (where ϕi = 1 and ϕ−i = 0 ) if Ci ∈ [0, piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i ] and
C−i ∈ [piS1S1−i − piS1S0|N−i ,+∞).
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• S1S1 case is an equilibrium if Ci ∈ [0, piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni ], for both i = 1, 2.
If Ci satisfies none of the conditions above, there exists no pure storage-investment equilib-
rium.13
Theorem 4 shows that the storage-investment equilibrium depends on the comparison between
the storage cost and the revenue difference between the cases S1S0 and S1S0, or the cases S1S0
and S1S1. Also, Theorem 4 implies that a lower storage cost will incentivize the supplier to invest
in storage.
According to Theorem 4, given the storage cost and the expected equilibrium revenue of each
subgame, we can characterize the pure equilibrium for nearly all values of Ci. However, if storage
cost Ci satisfies none of the conditions in Theorem 4, there will be no pure price equilibrium.
Note that when there is no pure storage-investment equilibrium, we can always characterize the
mixed equilibrium as the game in Stage I is a finite game [28]. We show how to compute the
mixed equilibrium in Appendix.XVII.
Since we cannot characterize close-form equilibrium revenues for the S1S0 and S0S0 subgames,
it remains challenging to characterize the storage-investment equilibrium with respect to the
system parameters, e.g., the storage cost and demand. In the next subsection, we will focus on
deriving insights of the storage-investment equilibrium in some special and practically interesting
cases.
B. Impact of storage cost and demand on storage-investment equilibrium
We analyze the impact of storage cost and demand on the storage-investment equilibrium and
have the analytical results for the cases when: (i) the storage cost Ci is sufficiently large; (ii) the
demand Dm,t is sufficiently large or small. We present all the proofs in Appendix.XVII.
To better illustrate the storage-investment equilibrium, we show one simulation result of the
equilibrium split (i.e., the storage-investment equilibrium with respect to parameters such as the
demand and the storage cost) in Figure 3, and the details of the simulation setup are presented
in Section VIII. In this simulation, for the illustration purpose, we consider the same demand D
for any hour t of any month m. We also consider two homogeneous suppliers (with the same
13Note that if piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i < 0 or piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni < 0, then the set [0, piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i ] = ∅ or [0, piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni ] = ∅.





















Fig. 3: Equilibrium split with storage cost and demand at λ = 1.5 HKD/kWh.
storage cost, the same renewable energy capacity and the same renewable energy distribution)
to reveal the impact on storage-investment decision.14 In Figure 3 (where the penalty price is
λ = 1.5 Hong Kong dollars (HKD) per kWh), with respect to the demand and storage cost, the
storage-investment equilibrium is divided into three regions: Region I of S1S1 (the left side of
the red curve), Region II of S1S0 (between the red curve and the blue curve), and Region III of
S0S0 (the right side of the blue curve).
First, for the impact of the storage cost, a higher storage cost will discourage suppliers from
investing in storage as implied in Theorem 4. We will further show that when the storage cost
is higher than a threshold, no suppliers will invest in storage no matter what the demand or
penalty. However, counter-intuitively, we also find that in the case of a zero storage cost, not
both suppliers will invest in storage once the demand is lower than a certain threshold.
As shown in Figure 3, when the storage cost is larger than a threshold, i.e., C > 0.86 × 103
HKD, the S0S0 case will be the only equilibrium (independent of the demand D) and no suppliers
invest in storage. We show this property in Proposition 6. The reason is that the benefit from
investing in storage is bounded. When the storage cost is greater than a threshold corresponding
to the bounded benefit, no suppliers will choose to invest in storage.
14We can prove that a pure Nash equilibrium of storage investment always exists in this homogeneous case. However, for the
heterogeneous case, we cannot theoretically prove that the pure Nash equilibrium always exists. In Appendix, we simulate an
example with two heterogeneous suppliers (with different capacities of renewables) and show the storage-investment equilibrium
in such a heterogeneous case.
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Proposition 6. There exists a threshold CS0S0i such that if the storage cost satisfies Ci > C
S0S0
i
for both i = 1, 2, the S0S0 case will be the unique pure storage-investment equilibrium.
However, as shown in Figure 3, when the demand is smaller than a certain threshold, i.e.,
D < 2.8 MW, the S1S1 case cannot be a pure equilibrium even when the storage cost C = 0. We
show this property in Proposition 7. The reason is that when the demand is smaller than a certain
threshold, in the S1S1 case, both suppliers can only get zero revenues (as shown in Proposition 2)
due to the competition. Thus, if the S1S1 case is the storage-investment state where both suppliers
invest in storage, one supplier can always deviate to not investing in storage, which can bring
him a strictly positive profit as implied in Proposition 5.
Proposition 7. If the demand satisfies 0 < Dm,t ≤ mini E[Xm,ti ] for any t and m, the S1S1 case
cannot be the equilibrium.
Second, for the impact of demand, we already show that at a sufficiently low demand, the
S1S1 case cannot be the equilibrium in Proposition 7. We will further show that if the demand
is higher than a certain threshold, each supplier has a dominant strategy of whether to invest in
storage based on his storage cost, which does not depend on the other supplier’s decision. For
example, at D > 11 MW in Figure 3, for these two homogeneous suppliers, if the storage cost is
higher than a threshold, i.e., C > 0.63× 103 HKD, each supplier will not invest in storage (i.e.,
S0S0); otherwise, each supplier will invest (i.e., S1S1). We show this property in Proposition 8.
The reason is that if the demand is large enough, both suppliers can bid the highest price and sell
out the maximum bidding quantity. Thus, there is no competition between suppliers, and they
will make storage-investment decisions based on their own storage costs.
Proposition 8. There exists Dm,t,th > 0 and C thi > 0, such that when the demand satisfies
Dm,t ≥ Dm,t,th for any t and m, supplier i has the dominant strategy ϕ∗i as follows.15
ϕ∗i =

1, if the storage cost Ci ≤ C thi ,
0, if the storage cost Ci > C thi .
(15)
15 We characterize the close-form threshold Dm,t,th > 0 and C thi > 0 in Appendix.XVII.
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C. Strictly positive profits of suppliers
We show that in suppliers’ competition facing the cost of storage investment, both suppliers
can get strictly positive profits.
Proposition 9 (strictly positive profit). Both suppliers will get strictly positive profits at the
storage-investment equilibrium.
This proposition also shows the benefit of the uncertainty of renewable generation, which is
similar to Proposition 5. Recall that if both suppliers have stable outputs, they may get zero
revenue (shown in Proposition 2) and thus get negative profit considering the storage cost.
However, with the random generation, both suppliers will get strictly positive profits at the
storage-investment equilibrium even facing the storage cost. We will explain it as follows. Note
that in the S0S0 case or the S1S0 case, the without-storage supplier always gets a strictly positive
revenue (shown in Proposition 5) with a zero storage cost. In the S1S0 case or the S1S1 case,
if the with-storage supplier gets a non-positive profit, he can always deviate to not investing in
storage. This deviation provides him a strictly positive profit, which implies that the supplier will
always get strictly positive profit.
VII. CHARACTERIZATION OF STORAGE CAPACITY
We propose a probability-based method using historical data of renewable generations to
compute the storage capacity. Note that suppliers charge and discharge the storage to maintain his
output at the mean value of the random renewable generations as shown in (1).16 Therefore, the
charge and discharge amounts are also random variables, and we characterize the storage capacity
such that its energy level will not exceed the storage capacity with a targeted probability. In this
part, we focus on the storage with 100% charge and discharge efficiency and no degradation
cost. In Appendix.XIII, we show that a lower charge/discharge efficiency and the consideration
of degradation cost will increase the total storage cost of a supplier, which further affects the
storage-investment equilibrium.
16It is interesting to size the variable storage capacity considering the possibility of not completely smoothing out the renewable
output. However, it is quite challenging to characterize such an equilibrium storage capacity in closed-form, which we will study
as future work.
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To begin with, we set a probability target α, and we aim to find a storage capacity Si such
that the energy level in the storage exceeds the capacity with a probability no greater than α.
Specifically, the with-storage supplier i will charge and discharge storage with value CDm,ti at
hour t of month m as shown in (1). We assume that the initial energy level of storage is fixed for
all the months and denote it as Sli . Note that the energy level of storage is the sum of the charge
and discharge over the time, and is constrained by the storage capacity. Starting from the initial
energy level Sli , the probability that energy level exceeds the minimum capacity (i.e., zero) and the













i > Si), respectively. Considering all months m, we aim to






















] ≤ α. (17)
Then, we describe how to use historical data [29] to compute the storage capacity that satisfies
the probability threshold as in (16) and (17). we will first characterize an upper bound for the
probability that energy level exceeds the given storage capacity in terms of the random variable
CDm,ti , and then we propose Algorithm 1 to compute the required storage capacity to satisfy
(16) and (17).
First, given the underflow capacity Sli > 0 and overflow capacity S
u
i , Si − Sli > 0, we






i < 0) and an upper bound






i > Si), respectively. We characterize these upper bounds
based on Markov inequality [30], which is shown in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 (Markov-inequality-based upper bound). Given Sli > 0 and Sui > 0, the Markov-
inequality-based upper bounds are shown as follows.














• For the upper bound Pru,m(Sui ):














Note that Prl,m(Sli) and Pr




i , respectively. Also, Pr
l,m(Sli)→
0 as Sli → +∞, and Pru,m(Sui ) → 0 as Sui → +∞. These show that a larger capacity will
decrease the probability that the charge/discharge exceeds the capacity. Also, for any probability
threshold α > 0, we can always find a capacity, such that the probability that energy level exceeds
the capacity is below α.
Second, we propose Algorithm 1 to characterize the storage capacity Si based on the historical
data of CDm,ti (derived from the renewable generation data of X
m,t
i ). We use the underflow
capacity Sli for supplier i as an example for illustration, and the overflow capacity S
u
i follows
the same procedure. Specifically, for the underflow capacity Sli , we search it in an increasing
order from zero as in Step 4. Given Sli , for each month m, we calculate the exceeding probability
Prl,m(Sli) according to (18) as in Steps 5-7. Note that based on the data samples of
∑t′
t=1−CDm,ti ,
Bl(s) is strictly convex in s. Thus, for any Sli > 0, the value of mins>0B
l(s) can be efficiently
computed using Newton’s method [31]. Further, we conduct an exhaustive search for t′ ∈ T to
obtain Prl,m(Sli). We calculate the expected exceeding probability Em[Prl,m(Sli)] over months
as in Step 8. We obtain the minimal underflow capacity Sli if the exceeding probability satisfies
Em[Prl,m(Sli)] ≤ α as in Step 9. Similarly, we can get the minimal overflow capacity Sui . The
required storage capacity is calculated as in Step 11.
As an illustration, we calculate and show the underflow probability Em[Prl,m(Sli)] and overflow
probability Em[Pru,m(Sui )] in the blue solid curve and red dashed curve respectively in Figure
4. The probability of Em[Prl,m(Sli)] (Em[Pru,m(Sui )], respectively) decreases with respect to the
capacity Sli (S
u




i , respectively) is small and close to zero, the
exceeding probability Em[Prl,m(Sli)] (Em[Pru,m(Sui )], respectively) will approach one. However,
when the capacity is large and close to a certain value (e.g., 6 in Figure 4), the corresponding
exceeding probability will be close to zero. We choose the probability threshold α = 5% and
obtain the corresponding minimal capacity Sl∗i and S
u∗
i as marked in Figure 4.
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Algorithm 1 Storage capacity Si
1: initialization: set iteration index Sli = Sui = 0, step size ∆S;
2: for each k ∈ {l, u} do
3: repeat
4: Ski := S
k
i + ∆S;
5: for each m ∈M do
6: Supplier i calculates Prk,m(Ski ) according to (18) or (19);
7: end for
8: Supplier i calculates Em[Prk,m(Ski )];
9: until
Em[Prk,m(Ski )] ≤ α;
10: end for








In simulations, in addition to some analytical properties of storage-investment equilibrium
shown in Section VI, we will further investigate the impact of the penalty, storage cost, and
demand on suppliers’ profits. We will show some counter-intuitive results due to the competition
between suppliers. For example, a higher penalty, a higher storage cost, and a lower demand
can even increase a supplier’s profit at the storage-investment equilibrium. Furthermore, the first
supplier who invests in storage may benefit less than the competitor who does not invest in
storage. We will illustrate the detailed results in the following.
A. Simulation setup
In simulations, we consider two homogeneous suppliers (with the same renewable capacity,
generation distribution, and storage cost) to show the storage-investment equilibrium. We also
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Fig. 4: Characterization of storage capacity.
consider a fixed demand D for all the hours and months for illustration. Next, we explain the
empirical distribution of renewable generation as well as parameter configurations of the penalty
price λ, demand D, and storage cost C.
1) Empirical distribution of renewable generation: We use the historical data of solar energy
generation in Hong Kong from the year 1993 to year 2012 [29] to approximate the continuous
CDF of suppliers’ renewable generations. Specifically, we cluster the renewable generations at
hour t of all days into M = 12 types (months) considering the seasonal effect. We use daily data
(from the year 1993 to year 2012) of renewable energy in month m at hour t to approximate
the distribution of renewable generation at hour t of month m. Based on the discrete data, we
characterize a continuous empirical CDF to model the distribution of renewable power. We present
the details of the characterization of empirical CDF in Appendix.XIV.
Furthermore, to check the reliability of the empirical distribution, we consider two sample data
sets: one set consists of all the data samples from the year 1993 to 2012, and the other consists
of the data samples from another specific year (e.g., 2013). We conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test [32] using the Matlab function kstest2 to test whether these two data sets are from the same
continuous distribution [33]. The result shows that most of the hours of a month can pass the test.
Also, our model is general for any continuous distribution of renewable generations. Interested
readers can also use other data or other distributions of renewable energy to test the results.
35
May: Hour











Fig. 5: Average solar energy of different hours in May.
2) Parameters configuration : We explain the configuration of the parameters of the penalty
price λ, demand D, and storage cost C, respectively. We set the parameters to reflect the real-
world practice, and study the impact of the parameters on the market equilibrium.
• The penalty λ: We choose the price cap p¯ = 1 HKD/kWh, since the electricity price for
residential users in Hong Kong is around 1 HKD/kWh [34]. Note that a penalty price satisfies
λ > p¯. In Figure 6(a), we will consider a wide range of the ratio λ
p¯
∈ [1.2, 20] to demonstrate
the impact of the penalty. In Figures 6(b)(c)(d), we fix the penalty price λ = 1.5 HKD/kWh
and focus on illustrating the impact of other parameters.
• The demand D: In Figure 6(d), we will discuss a wide range of demand from 0 MW to
15MW to show the impact of the demand. As a comparison, in Figure 5, we show the
average renewable power across hours in May. In Figure 6(a) and (b), we fix the demand at
D = 1 MW to show the impact of other parameters (λ and C). In Figure 6(c), we choose
a larger demand D = 12 MW and a smaller demand D = 6 MW to show the impact of
demand on the equilibrium profit.
• The Storage cost Ci: Recall that the storage investment cost is Ci = ciκiSi. There are
different types of storage technologies with diverse capital costs and lifespans. For example,
the pumped hydroelectric storage is usually cheap, and can last for 30 years with the capital
cost ci = 40 ∼ 800 HKD/kWh, while the Li-ion battery can last 15 years with the capital cost
about ci = 1600 ∼ 9000 HKD/kWh [35]. We choose the annual interest rate ri = 5%, and
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the storage capacity for the with-storage supplier is characterized as 43 MWh by Algorithm
1. We capture the impact of parameters ci and κi through the storage cost Ci. According
to the calculation of storage investment cost Ci = ciκiSi, we can calculate that the (hourly)
investment cost Ci of the pumped hydroelectric storage is 0.012× 103 − 0.255× 103 HKD
and the cost of the Li-ion battery is 0.76 × 103 − 4.36 × 103 HKD. This shows that the
storage cost can have a wide range.17 Then, in Figures 6(c), we will consider a wide range
of storage costs from 0 to 2×103 HKD. Although zero storage cost is not very practical, we
use it to show a low storage cost and capture the entire range of the impact of the storage
costs. In Figure 6(a)(b)(d), we choose lower storage costs (0.1× 103 and 0.15× 103 HKD)
and higher storage costs (1 × 103 and 1.5 × 103 HKD) to show the different results under
different storage costs.
B. Simulation results
We will discuss the impact of penalty, storage cost, and demand on suppliers’ profits, and show
some counter-intuitive results due to the competition between suppliers.
1) The impact of penalty on suppliers’ profits: Although a higher penalty λ can increase the
penalty cost on the without-storage supplier, surprisingly, we find that a higher penalty can also
increase this supplier’s profit, due to the reduced market competition in the energy market.
We show how suppliers’ profits and expected bidding prices at the storage-investment equi-
librium change with the penalty (at demand D = 1 MW) in Figure 6(a) and 6(b), respectively.
Different colors represent different storage costs. The diamond marker shows that S0S0 is the
storage-investment equilibrium, and the circle marker shows that S1S0 is the equilibrium. Also,
when S1S0 is the equilibrium, the solid lines and dashed lines distinguish the with-storage supplier
and without-storage supplier, respectively.
First, we show that at the equilibrium where both suppliers do not invest in storage (i.e., S0S0),
a higher penalty λ can increase both suppliers’ profits. As shown in Figure 6(a), when the storage
cost is high at C = 1.5 × 103 HKD, both suppliers will not invest in storage for any value of
the penalty λ from 1.2 HKD/kWh to 20 HKD/kWh (in blue curve with diamond marker). In
17Note that we only consider the investment cost in the storage cost. In practice, there are also other costs that need to be
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Fig. 6: (a) Profit of suppliers with penalty (D = 1 MW); (b) Expected bidding price of suppliers
with penalty (D = 1 MW); (c) Profit of suppliers with storage cost (λ = 1.5 HKD/kWh); (d)
Profit of suppliers with demand (λ = 1.5 HKD/kWh).
this case, both suppliers’ profits can first increase (at λ < 11 HKD/kWh) and then decrease (at
λ > 11 HKD/kWh) with λ (in blue curve). The intuition for the increase of profit at λ < 11
HKD/kWh is that a higher penalty decreases both suppliers’ bidding quantity if the bidding price
remains the same. This reduces the market competition and enables both suppliers to bid a higher
price in the local energy market as shown in Figure 6(b) (in blue curve). However, the increased
penalty also increases the penalty cost on suppliers, so the suppliers’ profits will also decrease
if the penalty is too high (at λ > 11 HKD/kWh).
Second, we show that at the equilibrium where one supplier invests in storage and one does
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not (i.e., S1S0), a higher penalty λ can also increase both suppliers’ profits. We consider a low
storage cost C = 0.15×103 HKD as in red curves in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b). We see that if λ
is low (at λ < λa), both suppliers will not invest in storage (i.e., S0S0), and their profits increase
with penalty shown in Figure 6(a) (at λ < λa in red curve with diamond marker that overlaps
with blue curve). As the penalty increases (at λ > λa), the equilibrium will change from S0S0 to
S1S0, since a higher penalty and a lower storage cost can enable a supplier to enjoy more benefits
by investing in storage. We discuss the profit of the with-storage supplier and without-storage
supplier respectively as follows.
• For the with-storage supplier, as shown in Figure 6(a), when λ > λa, his profit increases as
penalty increases (in red solid curve), which can be much higher than the without-storage
supplier (in red dashed curve). The reason is that in the S1S0 case, the penalty cost makes
the with-storage supplier dominate over the without-storage one. The with-storage supplier
can bid higher prices than the without-storage supplier as shown in Figure 6(b) (in red solid
curve and red dashed curve), and he also does not need to pay the penalty cost.
• However, for the without-storage supplier, as shown in Figure 6(a), his profit also slightly
increases as the penalty increases around λa < λ < 10 HKD/kWh (in red dashed curve).
The intuition is that a higher penalty gives the advantage to the with-storage supplier, which
reduces the market competition and increases both suppliers’ bidding price as shown in
Figure 6(b) (in red curves). Thus, it can also benefit the without-storage supplier. However,
as shown in Figure 6(a), if the penalty further increases to λ > 10 HKD/kWh (in red dashed
curve), the without-storage supplier’s profit will also decrease due to the increased penalty
cost.
2) The impact of storage cost on suppliers’ profits: Intuitively, a higher storage cost will
discourage a supplier from investing in storage, which generally decreases a supplier’s profit.
However, we find that it may also increase a supplier’s profit if the other supplier changes his
strategy due to the increased storage cost.
We show how suppliers’ profits at the storage-investment equilibrium change with the storage
cost in Figure 6(c). Different colors represent different demands. The diamond marker, circle
marker, and star marker correspond to different storage-investment equilibria of S0S0, S1S0, and
S1S1, respectively. For the S1S0 case, the solid lines and dashed lines distinguish the with-storage
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supplier and without-storage supplier, respectively.
As shown in Figure 6(c) (in both red curve and blue curve), generally the higher storage cost
decreases suppliers’ profits. However, we show that the opposite may be true using the example
of D = 6 MW (in red curve). When the demand is at D = 6 MW (in red curve), as the storage
cost increases, the equilibrium changes from S1S1 (when C < Ca), to S1S0 (when Ca < C < Cb),
and finally to S0S0 (when C > Cb). When the equilibrium changes from S1S1 to S1S0 at the
threshold C = Ca, one with-storage supplier in the original S1S1 case has a higher (upward
jumping) profit, after the other supplier chooses not to invest in storage due to the high storage
cost. This changes the equilibrium from S1S1 to S1S0, which reduces the competition and gives
more advantages to the with-storage supplier.
3) The impact of demand on suppliers’ profits: Intuitively, a higher demand will increase a
supplier’s profit. However, we show that a higher demand may also decrease a supplier’s profit
if the other supplier changes his strategy due to the increased demand.
We show how suppliers’ profits at the storage-investment equilibrium change with the demand
in Figure 6(d). Different colors represent different storage costs. The diamond marker, circle
marker, and star marker correspond to different storage-investment equilibria of S0S0, S1S0, and
S1S1, respectively. For the S1S0 case, the solid lines and dashed lines distinguish the with-storage
supplier and without-storage supplier respectively.
As shown in Figure 6(d) (in both red curve and blue curve), generally a higher demand
increases a supplier’s profit. However, we show that the opposite may be true using the example
of C = 0.1× 103 HKD (in red curve). When the storage cost is low at C = 0.1× 103 HKD (in
red curve), as the demand increases, the equilibrium changes from S0S0 (when D < Da), to S1S0
(when Da < D < Db), and finally to S1S1 (when D > Db). When the equilibrium changes from
S1S0 to S1S1 at the threshold D = Db, the with-storage supplier in the original S1S0 case has a
smaller (downward jumping) profit, after the other supplier also chooses to invest in storage due
to the high demand. This changes the equilibrium from S1S0 to S1S1, which increases the market
competition and weakens the advantage of the with-storage supplier in the original S1S0 case.
Furthermore, when the storage cost is high at C = 1.5× 103 HKD (in blue curve with diamond
marker), both suppliers will not invest in storage independent of the demand.
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4) First-mover disadvantage and advantage: Intuitively, the first supplier who invests in stor-
age can benefit more than the without-storage competitor. However, we find that if the storage
cost is high, the first-mover supplier in investing storage can also benefit less than the free-rider
competitor who does not invest in storage.
As shown in Figure 6(c) at D = 6 MW (in red curve), the S1S0 case is the equilibrium when the
storage cost is in the range Ca < C < Cb. If the storage cost is low at Ca < C < 0.7×103 HKD,
the with-storage supplier’s profit is higher than the without-storage supplier’s profit. However, if
the storage cost is high at 0.7× 103 HKD < C < Cb, the with-storage supplier’s profit is lower
than the without-storage supplier. This shows both advantage and disadvantage of the first-mover.
Although in some situations investing storage will increase the supplier’s profit, he can get more
profits if he waits for the other to invest first when the storage cost is high. However, if the
storage cost is low, he should be the first to invest storage in order to get a higher profit.
IX. EXTENSIONS: A MORE GENERAL OLIGOPOLY MODEL
We build a more general oligopoly model and extend some of the theoretical results and
insights from the duopoly case to the oligopoly case. Compared with the duopoly model, the
only difference of the oligopoly model is that the number of suppliers can be more than two,
i.e., |I| ≥ 2. Following the analysis of the duopoly model, we also analyze the equilibrium in
Stage II and Stage I in the oligopoly case and derive some insights. Specifically, in Stage II,
we extend the theoretical results of the price-quantity competition equilibrium. In Stage I, we
generalize analytical results of the impact of storage cost and demand on the storage-investment
equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that some of the key insights from the duopoly case, e.g.,
the uncertainty of renewable generation can be beneficial to suppliers, still hold in the oligopoly
case. Next, we will discuss the extensions of Stage II and Stage I in detail, respectively. We
include all the proofs of the propositions in Appendix.XVIII.
A. Stage II Analysis
For Stage II, the weakly dominant strategy of bidding quantities still hold for the case of more
than two suppliers. We generalize the conditions on the existence of the pure price equilibrium
and show that the mixed price equilibrium also exists in the oligopoly case. Furthermore, we
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show that suppliers get positive revenues at the mixed price equilibrium. We show the extended
analysis in detail as follows.
1) Weakly dominant strategy for bidding quantities: The weakly dominant strategies for bid-
ding quantities still hold as in Theorem 1.
2) Existence of the pure price equilibrium: We derive the conditions for the existence of the
pure price equilibrium among suppliers, and generalize Proposition 2. Specifically, we consider
a general subgame in Stage II denoted as SU|V , where suppliers in the set U invest in storage
and suppliers in the set V do not invest. Recall we denote the set of all the suppliers as I, and
we have U ⋃V = I. The case U = I means that all the suppliers invest in storage, and the
case V = I means that no supplier invests in storage. We show the existence of the pure price
equilibrium in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11 (existence of the pure price equilibrium in the oligopoly case). Considering a
subgame SU|V of storage investment among suppliers in Stage II, the existence of the pure price
equilibrium depends on the demand D as follows:
• If D ≥ ∑i∈I y∗i (p¯, ϕi), there exists a pure price equilibrium p∗i = p¯, with an equilibrium
revenue piREi = λ
∫ F−1i (p¯/λ)
0
xfi(x)dx for any i ∈ V and piREi = p¯E[Xi] for any i ∈ U .
• If D ≤ ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj) for any j ∈ U , there exists a pure price equilibrium
p∗i = 0, with an equilibrium revenue pi
RE
i = 0, for any i ∈ I.
• If there exists j ∈ U such that ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj) < D < ∑i∈I y∗i (p¯, ϕi), there is
no pure price equilibrium.
Similar to the duopoly case, the result of this proposition can be interpreted as follows. If the




i (p¯, ϕi), all the suppliers can bid the price cap to sell
the maximum quantities. If the demand is very low such that D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj) for
any j ∈ U , the competition is fierce and all the suppliers bid zero price. However, if the demand
is in the middle, there will be no pure price equilibrium.
Note that if the number of with-storage suppliers is no greater than one, i.e., | U |≤ 1, the
condition that there exists j ∈ U such that D ≤ ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj) cannot be satisfied.
It means that there will be no pure equilibrium of p∗i = 0 for any demand D > 0.
42
3) Existence of the mixed price equilibrium: For the case in Proposition 11 that there exists
no pure price equilibrium, we show that there exists a mixed price equilibrium. However, the
characterization of mixed strategy is highly non-trivial for the oligopoly case and it is difficult
to completely generalize Lemma 1. We generalize it partially as Proposition 12 to show the
existence of the mixed price equilibrium and show that all the suppliers get positive revenues at
the mixed price equilibrium.
Proposition 12 (mixed price equilibrium in the oligopoly case). For any ϕ, when there is no
pure price equilibrium, a mixed price equilibrium exists and the equilibrium electricity-selling
revenues piREi satisfies pi
RE
i (ϕ) > 0, for any i ∈ I.
The equilibrium revenue for the case where all the suppliers invest storage (i.e., U = I) has
been characterized in [17]. When there are two suppliers, we can also characterize the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the mixed price strategy for the case of one investing storage and
one not investing in storage as in Theorem 2. However, when I > 2, for any case where | U |< I ,
it is highly non-trivial to characterize the corresponding CDF analytically.
B. Stage I Analysis
For Stage I, for the general oligopoly case, we show that a mixed storage-investment equilibrium
always exists. We can also generalize the analytical results of the impact of storage cost and
demand on the storage-investment equilibrium for those settings where (i) the storage cost is
sufficiently large; and (ii) the demand is sufficiently large or small. Furthermore, some of the
key insights, e.g., the uncertainty of renewable generation can be beneficial to suppliers, will still
hold for the oligopoly case. We discuss the extensions in details in the following.
1) Existence of the storage-investment equilibrium: A mixed equilibrium of storage investment
always exists. Note that each supplier has two strategies: investing in storage and not investing
in storage. Numerically, we can check the pure storage-investment equilibrium by the Nash
equilibrium definition. Also, a mixed equilibrium of storage investment always exists due to the
finite numbers of storage-investment strategies [28].
2) Impacts of the storage cost and demand on storage-investment equilibrium: Some analysis
of the impact of the storage cost and demand on storage-investment equilibrium in the duopoly
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case can also be extended. Specifically, we can extend Propositions 6, 7 and 8 and to the
oligopoly case, which generalizes the analytical results for the settings where (i) the storage
cost is sufficiently large; and (ii) the demand is sufficiently large or small.
First, since the benefit from investing in storage is bounded, we can show that when the storage
cost is greater than a threshold, no suppliers will choose to invest in storage.
Proposition 13. There exists a threshold Cnoi such that if the storage cost satisfies Ci > Cnoi
for any i ∈ I, the S∅|I case (i.e., no suppliers investing in storage) will be the unique pure
storage-investment equilibrium.
Second, in the subgame SU|V where | U |≥ 2, if the demand is too low, all the suppliers may get
zero revenue in the energy market as implied in Proposition 11. This will make the with-storage
suppliers deviate to not investing in storage. Thus, we have the proposition as follows.





y∗j (p¯, ϕj)) for any t and m, the case S
U|V (i.e., suppliers in set U invest in storage and suppliers
in set V do not invest in storage) cannot be a pure storage-investment equilibrium.
Third, as in Proposition 11, when the demand is higher than certain threshold, all the suppliers
can bid the price cap to sell all his bidding quantity. In this case, there is no competition between
suppliers, and they will make storage-investment decisions independently based on their own
storage costs. We show this proposition as follows.
Proposition 15. There exist Dm,t,th > 0 and C thi > 0, such that when the demand satisfies
Dm,t ≥ Dm,tth for any t and m, supplier i has the dominant strategy ϕ∗i as follows.
ϕ∗i =

1, if the storage cost Ci ≤ C thi ,
0, if the storage cost Ci > C thi .
(20)
3) Positive profits at the storage-investment equilibrium: We can further extend Proposition
9 to show the benefit of the uncertainty to the equilibrium profit. We show that in suppliers’
competition (even with the potential cost of the storage investment), all the suppliers can get
strictly positive profits at the equilibrium.
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Proposition 16 (strictly positive profit). All the suppliers will get strictly positive profits at the
storage-investment equilibrium.
This proposition shows the benefit of the renewable generation randomness. If all the suppliers
have stable outputs, they may get zero revenue as implied in Proposition 11 and thus get negative
profit under possible storage cost. However, with the random generation, all the suppliers will
get strictly positive profit at the storage-investment equilibrium even considering the storage cost.
The intuition is that if one supplier invests in storage and gets non-positive profit, he can always
choose not to invest in storage. This at least saves him the cost of storage investment, which
increases his profit. Also, note that when no supplier invests in storage, all the suppliers can get
positive profits. Therefore, only the state where all the suppliers get positive profits can be an
equilibrium.
In summary, we can extend some of our major theoretical results and insights to the oligopoly
case of more than two suppliers. Some of the key insights from the duopoly case, e.g., the
uncertainty of renewable generation can be beneficial to suppliers, still hold in the oligopoly
case. However, we are not able to analytically extend all insights to the oligopoly case due to
the complexity of analysis. We would like to explore it in our future work.
X. CONCLUSION
We study a duopoly two-settlement local energy market where renewable energy suppliers com-
pete to sell electricity to consumers with or without energy storage. We formulate the interactions
between suppliers and consumers as a three-stage game-theoretic model. We characterize a price-
quantity competition equilibrium in the local energy market, and further characterize a storage-
investment equilibrium at the beginning of the investment horizon between suppliers. Surprisingly,
we find the uncertainty of renewable generation can increase suppliers’ profits compared with
the case where both suppliers invest in storage and stabilize the outputs. In simulations, we show
more counterintuitive results due to the market competition. For example, a higher penalty, a
higher storage cost, and a lower demand may increase a supplier’s profit. We also show that the
first-mover in investing in storage may benefit less than the free-rider competitor who does not
invest in storage. In the future work, we will size the variable storage capacity considering the
possibility of not completely smoothing out the renewable output.
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APPENDIX
This appendix is organized as follows:
• Section XI: We show the equilibrium revenue of suppliers in the S1S1 case, when the demand




i (p¯, ϕi) and there is no pure price equilibrium but the
mixed price equilibrium.
• Section XII: We show how we discretize the continuous price set to approximate the mixed
price equilibrium in the S0S0 case.
• Section XIII: For the storage capacity characterization, we first show the proof of the
propositions in Section VII, and then we present the model of the imperfect storage.
• Section XIV: For the simulations, we first show the characterization of the continuous CDF
for the renewable-generation distribution using historical data, and then we simulate an
example of two heterogeneous suppliers.
• Section XV: We prove the theorems and propositions of Stage III.
• Section XVI: We prove the theorems and propositions of Stage II.
• Section XVII: We prove the theorems and propositions of Stage I.
• Section XVIII: We prove the propositions in the oligopoly model.
XI. APPENDIX: MIXED PRICE EQUILIBRIUM OF S1S1 SUBGAME





there is no pure price equilibrium. We can characterize a close-form equilibrium revenue for
each supplier at the mixed price equilibrium in Proposition 17, which has been proved in [17].
Proposition 17 (S1S1: mixed-equilibrium revenue). In the S1S1 case (i.e.,
∑
i=1 ϕi = 2), if
mini y
∗




i , there exists no pure price equilibrium but exists the mixed price equilib-
rium, with the equilibrium revenue as follows.
piREi (ϕ) =

p¯(D − y∗−i), if y∗i > y∗−i,
p¯(D − y∗i )y∗i
min(y∗−i, D)
, otherwise,
where y∗i = E[Xi] and y∗−i = E[X−i] as characterized in Theorem 1.
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According to Proposition 17, one supplier’s equilibrium revenue is related to the other supplier’s
bidding quantity (i.e., mean value of generations). Specifically, one supplier’s equilibrium revenue
decreases if the other supplier’s bidding quantity increases. Furthermore, under the mixed price
equilibrium, both suppliers get strictly positive revenues while they may get zero revenues when
the demand is below the threshold mini y∗i as shown in Proposition 2 under the pure price
equilibrium.
XII. APPENDIX: MIXED PRICE EQUILIBRIUM OF S0S0 SUBGAME
In the S0S0 case, both suppliers do not invest in storage and face the general penalty cost.




i (p¯, ϕi), the mixed price equilibrium has a continuous CDF over [l, p¯)
shown in Lemma 1, but we cannot derive it in close form. To have a better understanding of the
CDF, we discretize the price to approximate the original continuous price set, and compute the
mixed equilibrium for the discrete price set.
Specifically, we discretize the price between (0, p¯] into {∆p, 2∆p, 3∆p, ..., p¯ −∆p, p¯} with a
small ∆p > 0. We search for the lower support in the range given in (14) in the following way.
Given a lower support l′, the mixed strategy of each supplier has the support {l′, l′ + ∆p, l′ +
∆p, ..., p¯} that approximates the original continuous support [l, p¯]. For each supplier, each of price
strategies in the support yields the same expected revenue, which can be used to construct a set
of linear equations and calculate the mixed equilibrium. If the probability of each price for each
supplier is between (0, 1), then the lower support l′ is feasible; otherwise, there exists the price
that should be excluded from the support {l′, l′ + ∆p, l′ + ∆p, ..., p¯} and the lower support l′ is
not feasible. We calculate the equilibrium revenue according to Lemma 1 (ii).
XIII. APPENDIX: CHARACTERIZATION OF STORAGE CAPACITY
We will first prove Proposition 10 and show some properties of the upper bound Prl,m(Sli) and
Pru,m(Sui ). Then, we discuss the imperfect storage model and show how it affects the storage
cost.
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A. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof: Below, we illustrate the upper bound Prl,m(Sli). The upper bound Pru,m(Sui ) can be
derived analogously.



















for any s > 0. The inequality in (21) is due to the Markov inequality.18 Given Sli > 0, we can
find a tight upper bound for the probability Pr(
∑t′
t=1−CDm,ti > Sli) by minimizing the RHS in
(21) over s. Therefore, Prl,m(Sli) = maxt′ mins>0B
l(s).
B. Properties of some properties of the upper bound Prl,m(Sli) and Pr
u,m(Sui ).
We have properties for Prl,m(Sli) and Pr
u,m(Sui ) as follows.
Proposition 18 (properties of the upper bounds). Given Sli > 0 and Su > 0, the Markov-
inequality-based upper bounds have properties as follows.
1) Prl,m(Sli) ≤ 1 and Pru,m(Sui ) ≤ 1.
2) Prl,m(Sli) and Pr





3) Prl,m(Sli)→ 0 as Sli → +∞, and Pru,m(Sui )→ 0 as Sui → +∞.
Proof: The first property is because mins>0Bl(s) ≤ Bl(0−) = 1 and mins>0Bu(s) ≤
Bu(0−) = 1. The second property is straightforward from the function Bl(s) and Bu(s). The
third property is because CDm,ti is bounded. Thus, B
l(s)→ 0 as Sli → +∞, and Bu(s)→ 0 as
Sui → +∞.
Proposition 18 shows that a larger capacity decreases the charge/discharge exceeding probabil-
ity. Also, for any positive probability threshold α, we can always find a sufficiently large capacity
to let the exceeding probability below α. This lays the foundation for Algorithm 1.
C. Generalization of imperfect storage model
We consider the imperfect energy storage in two aspects: (i) less-than-100% charge and
discharge efficiency and (ii) the degradation cost incurred by the charge and discharge. Next, we
18This inequality is also known as Chernoff bound, which can achieve a tight probability bound [36].
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will explain how the storage charge and discharge are determined in our work, and then further
discuss how the imperfect storage impacts the total storage cost and investment equilibrium.
To begin with, we explain the model of the storage charge and discharge as well as the energy
level of the storage in our work. Specifically, the with-storage supplier charges and discharges
the energy storage to stabilize his renewable output at the mean value. Thus, the charge and
discharge power is only dependent on the random variable of renewable generations. At hour t
of renewable-generation-type (month) m, we denote the charge amount as CDm,t+i ≥ 0 and the




i − E[Xm,ti ])+, (22)
CDm,t−i = (X
m,t
i − E[Xm,ti ])−, (23)
where g+ , max(g, 0) and g− , max(−g, 0). Furthermore, we denote the charge efficiency as
ηci and the discharge efficiency as η
d
i . The energy level in the storage can be calculated by adding







i − CDm,t−i /ηdi . (24)
Next, we discuss how the degradation cost and the less-than-100% charge and discharge efficiency
impact the total storage cost.
1) Degradation cost: We show that the degradation cost will increase the total cost of deploying
the storage for the with-storage supplier. The degradation cost is caused by the charge and
discharge of the storage. In the ideal case, we do not include the degradation cost as part of
the storage cost. With the degradation, the total cost of deploying the storage will be higher.
One widely used model in the literature for the degradation cost is a linear model [37] [38]. We











which can be calculated based on the historical data of Xm,ti .
Therefore, We can simply add (25) to the original storage cost. We calculate the total storage
cost as C ′i = Ci + C
o
i , which includes both investment cost and the degradation cost.
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2) Charge and discharge efficiency: The lower charge and discharge efficiency will increase
the storage capacity and thus increase the total storage cost. Our goal is to characterize a minimum
storage capacity such that the energy level em,ti will exceed the storage capacity with a probability
no greater than α. As shown in (24), the charge and discharge efficiency (ηci , η
d
i ) will affect the




i = 100%, the difference
in the imperfect storage model is that ηci < 100% and η
d
i < 100%. With the charge and discharge










i − CDm,t−i /ηdi + Sli < 0)










i − CDm,t−i /ηdi + Sli > Si)
] ≤ α. (27)
Similarly, we can follow Algorithm 1 in Section XIII.A to compute Si given the probability
threshold α.
According to Algorithm 1 that computes the storage capacity, we show how charge/discharge
efficiency impacts the storage capacity in Figure 7. The blue curve shows the case where the
probability that the energy level exceeds the capacity is smaller than 5% and the red curve shows
the case where the probability that the energy level exceeds the capacity is smaller than 10%.
We see that as the efficiency decreases, the required storage capacity increases (which further
increases the storage investment cost).
efficiency (c=d)

















Fig. 7: Storage capacity with charge/discharge efficiency.
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In summary, compared with the case of perfect storage, a lower charge/discharge efficiency
with the degradation cost will increase the total storage cost of a supplier. In Section VI, we
present some analytical results of the storage cost’ s impact on the storage-investment equilibrium.
In Section VIII, we also show the simulation results of the impact of the storage cost on the
suppliers’ profits. These discussions can capture the impact of the imperfect storage.
XIV. APPENDIX: SIMULATIONS
We will first show the details of how we approximate the continuous CDF for the renewable-
generation distribution using historical data. Then, we show a simulation result for two hetero-
geneous suppliers.
A. Empirical distribution of renewable generations
We use the historical data of solar energy in Hong Kong from the year 1993 to year 2012 [29] to
approximate the continuous CDF of suppliers’ renewable generations. Specifically, we cluster the
renewable generations at hour t of all days into M = 12 types (months) considering the seasonal
effect. We use daily data (from the year 1993 to year 2012) of renewable energy in month m at
hour t to approximate the distribution of renewable generation at hour t of month m. Based on
the discrete data, we first use an empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) to model the
renewable power distribution.19 Note that our model is built on the continuous CDF of suppliers’
renewable generations. Thus, we further use linear interpolation to set up the continuous ECDF
from the ECDF [40]. We illustrate the ECDF and linearly-interpolated ECDF in Figure 8(a),
where the stepwise blue solid curve represents the ECDF and the red dotted curve represents
the linearly-interpolated ECDF. For the illustration of renewable generation distribution, we show
the ECDF and linearly-interpolated ECDF of hour t = 9 of month m = 5 (May) in Figure 8(b).
Through the linearly-interpolated ECDF Fi, we can also compute the value F−1i (·) efficiently.




i=1 I (Xi ≤ x), where I(·) is the indicator function [39].
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Fig. 8: (a) Illustration of ECDF and linearly-interpolated ECDF; (b) ECDF and linearly-
interpolated ECDF at hour 9 of May.
B. Simulations of two heterogeneous suppliers
We simulate an example with two heterogeneous suppliers. Note that we can prove that a pure
Nash equilibrium of storage investment will always exist in the homogeneous case (with the same
storage cost, the same renewable energy capacity and the same renewable energy distribution).
However, for the general heterogeneous case, we cannot theoretically prove that the pure Nash
equilibrium always exists. In our following example of heterogeneous suppliers, the pure Nash
equilibrium of storage investment still exists.
Specifically, we consider that supplier 2’s renewable generation capacity is twice as much
as the capacity of supplier 1, where both suppliers have the same distribution of renewable
energy. For comparison, we consider the homogeneous case as in the simulation of the main
text where each supplier’s renewable generation capacity is equal to supplier 1’s capacity of the
heterogeneous case. In the following, we first assume that the storage investment cost is the
same across the two suppliers, and study the storage-investment equilibrium with respect to the
storage cost and demand in the homogeneous (capacity) case and heterogeneous (capacity) case,
respectively. Then, we allow the storage investment cost to also differ across the two suppliers
in the heterogeneous case, and study the storage-investment equilibrium with respect to the two
suppliers’ different storage costs.







































Fig. 9: (a) Equilibrium split in the homogeneous case; (b) Equilibrium split in the heterogeneous
case.
to focus on showing the impact of different capacities of renewables.20 Figure 9(a) shows the
equilibrium split in terms of demand and storage cost under the homogeneous case. Note that
this figure has been shown as Figure 3 of the main text. Figure 9(b) shows the equilibrium split
in terms of demand and storage cost under the heterogeneous case.
• In Figure 9(a), in Region I, both-investing-storage is one equilibrium; in Region III, neither-
investing-storage is one equilibrium; in Region II, one investing in storage and one not
investing in storage will be one equilibrium.
• In Figure 9(b), in the solid-grid region, both-investing-storage is one equilibrium; in the
dash-grid region, neither-investing-storage is one equilibrium; in the region bounded by the
red curve, supplier 1 does not invest in storage while supplier 2 should invest in storage;
and in the region bounded by the blue curve, supplier 1 invests in storage while supplier 2
does not invest in storage.
Generally, in the heterogeneous case, we see that the region where supplier 2 should invest
in storage is larger than the region of supplier 1. The intuition is that supplier 2 has a larger
capacity of renewables, which gives her advantage in the competition. When both suppliers face
20Note that the two suppliers have different storage capacities due to the different capacities of renewables. We choose different






























Fig. 10: Equilibrium split with storage cost.
the same high storage cost greater than 1000 HKD as in Figure 9(b), supplier 1 will not invest
in storage at the equilibrium for any demand D but supplier 2 may still invest in storage when
the demand is high. Also, the region of only supplier 1 investing in storage and only supplier 2
investing in storage can overlap under the heterogeneous case, which means that only supplier 1
investing in storage and only supplier 2 investing in storage are both equilibria.
Next we consider the case that two heterogeneous suppliers bear different storage investment
costs. We choose a certain demand (D = 4 MW) and show the equilibrium split with respect to
the storage cost of the two suppliers in Figure 10. In Figure 10, if the storage costs of supplier 1
and supplier 2 lie in Region A, neither supplier will invest in storage. In Region B, both suppliers
will invest in storage. In Region D, only supplier 2 invests in storage and supplier 1 will not
invest in storage. In Region C, only supplier 1 invests in storage and supplier 2 will not invest in
storage. However, in Region E, only supplier 1 investing in storage and only supplier 2 investing
in storage, are both equilibria.
XV. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF STAGE III
To prove Proposition 1, we will discuss the following two cases and analyze the objective
function of Problem (4) based on linear functions. For notation simplicity, we omit the superscript
m, t in the corresponding variables and parameters.
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• If p1 = p2 = p, we rewrite the objective function (4a) as
(Pg − p)(x1 + x2). (28)
Since Pg − p > 0, the optimal value is achieved at the maximum value of x1 + x2, i.e.,
min(D, y1 + y2) according to the constraints (4b) and (4c).
• If p1 6= p2, we assume p1 > p2 without loss of generality. We rewrite the objective function
(4a) as
(Pg − p2)(x1 + x2) + (p1 − p2)x1. (29)
Since Pg − p2 > 0 and p1 − p2 > 0, the optimal value is achieved at the maximum value of
x1 + x2 and the maximum value of x1 as follows:
x∗1 + x
∗
2 = min(D, y1 + y2), (30)
x∗1 = min(y1, D). (31)
Then, we obtain the optimal solution x∗2 = min(D, y1 +y2)−min(y1, D), which is equivalent
to x∗2 = min(D −min(y1, D), y2).
Combining the above two cases, we have Proposition 1 proved.
Remark 1: Proposition 1 can be easily extended to the oligopoly case with more than 2 suppliers.
Remark 2: Given the other supplier −i’s bidding price p−i and bidding quantity y−i, the supplier
i’s payoff function generally is not continuous in price pi at pi = p−i due to the discontinuous
change of the optimal capacity x∗i . This shows that given the other supplier −i’s decisions,
supplier i’s payoff function generally is discontinuous.
XVI. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF STAGE II
A. Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, the key step is to show that given price pi, the revenue function piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ)
of supplier i with respect to x∗i (p,y) is increasing on the interval (0, y
∗
i ) and decreasing on the
interval (y∗i ,+∞). Then, combined with Proposition 1, we can prove that y∗i will be the weakly
dominant strategy for the bidding quantity. We discuss the weakly dominant strategy for supplier
i with ϕi = 1 and ϕi = 0, respectively.
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1) Case of ϕi = 1: We will prove that the weakly dominant strategy of bidding quantity for
the with-storage supplier i (i.e., ϕi = 1) is y∗i (pi, ϕi) = E[Xi]. Given any price pi ≤ p¯ < λ,
the function piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ) with respect to x
∗
i (p,y) is linearly increasing on the interval




i (p,y),ϕ) ≤ piRi (pi,E[Xi],ϕ) (32)
Then, we discuss a total of three cases to show that with-storage supplier’s revenue cannot be
better off if he chooses strategy yi other than y∗i (pi, ϕi) = E[Xi]. For notation simplicity, we use
y∗i to represent y
∗
i (pi, ϕi) in the later discussion.
(a) If yi < y∗i = E[Xi], according to Proposition 1, we have
x∗i (p, (yi, y−i)) ≤ x∗i (p, (y∗i , y−i)) ≤ E[Xi], for any y−i, (33)
which (according to (32)) implies
piRi (pi, xi(p, (yi, y−i)),ϕ) ≤ pii(pi, xi(p, (y∗i , y−i)),ϕ) . (34)
(b) If yi > y∗i = E[Xi] and x∗i (p, (yi, y−i)) > E[Xi], according to Proposition 1, we have
x∗i (p, (y
∗
i , y−i)) = E[Xi],
which (according to (32)) implies
piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p, (yi, y−i)),ϕ) ≤ piRi (pi,E[Xi],ϕ) = piRi (pi, x∗i (p, (y∗i , y−i)),ϕ).
(c) If yi > y∗i = E[Xi] and x∗i (p, (yi, y−i)) ≤ E[Xi], according to Proposition 1, we have















Combining the above three conditions (a)-(c), we complete the proof that y∗i = E[Xi] if ϕi = 1.
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2) Case of ϕi = 0: We prove the weakly dominant strategy of bidding quantity for the without-





). We take the derivative of piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ) with





is increasing on the interval interval (0, F−1i (
pi
λ




Thus, given any price pi, we always have
piRi (pi, x
∗


















for supplier i with ϕi = 0.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We verify the pure price equilibrium according to Definition 2 that the supplier cannot be
better off if he deviates unilaterally. Towards this end, note that for supplier i with or without
storage, the revenue function piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ) is strictly increasing with respect to both the
price pi and the selling quantity x∗i (p,y) that is in the range [0, y
∗
i (pi, ϕi)] (without considering
the other supplier’s coupled decisions). We will discuss the three types of subgames respectively.
1) The type S0S0 (i.e.,
∑




i (p¯, ϕi), p1 = p2 = p¯
is a pure price equilibrium and show that this pure price equilibrium is unique. Then, we show




i (p¯, ϕi), there exists no pure price equilibrium.
(a) The case of D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi).
We first prove that when D ≥ ∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi), p1 = p2 = p¯ is a pure price equilibrium. When
p1 = p2 = p¯, according to Proposition 1, the total selling energy quantities of supplier 1 and
supplier 2 satisfy∑
i




2(p¯, ϕ2))) = min(D, y
∗
1(p¯, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p¯, ϕ2)) (36)
= y∗1(p¯, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p¯, ϕ2). (37)
Since x∗i (p,y) ≤ y∗i (pi, ϕi) always holds for any i = 1, 2, based on (37), we have
xi , x∗i ((p¯, p¯), (y∗1(p¯, ϕ1), y∗2(p¯, ϕ2))) = y∗i (p¯, ϕi). (38)
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We will show that both suppliers cannot be better off if they deviate from such a bidding strategy.
Without loss of generality, if supplier 1 bids a price p′1 < p¯ unilaterally, according to Proposition
1, we have





Since the revenue function piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ) is strictly increasing with respect to the price pi







1 (p¯, x1,ϕ) , (42)
which shows that supplier 1’s revenue decreases if he deviates from the price p¯. This proves that
p1 = p2 = p¯ is a pure price equilibrium.
Next, we show that this equilibrium is unique. Without loss of generality, suppose that supplier
1 bids a price p′1 < p¯ while the other supplier bids a price p
′










1, ϕ1) ≤ y∗1(p¯, ϕ1). (43)
Therefore, supplier 1 can always increase his price p′i to p¯, which will increase his revenue due
to the increased price and non-decreasing selling quantity. Thus, any price pair (p1, p2) 6= (p¯, p¯)
can’t be an equilibrium.




i (p¯, ϕi) .
We will assume that both suppliers bid the pure prices and will discuss a total of three cases
in the following to show that no pure price strategy can be an equilibrium.
First, suppliers’ bidding prices are not equal, and we assume pi < p−i without loss of generality.
the lower-price supplier can always increase the price by a small ε > 0 such that p′i = pi+ε < p−i.
Then, the bidding price p′i > pi and the selling quantity at p
′





min {D, y∗i (pi + ε, ϕi)} ≥ xi = min (D, y∗i (pi, ϕi)). In this case, we denote the revenue at the
original price pi as pii, and the revenue at the price p′i as pi
′
i. We have pi
′
i > pii since p
′
i > pi and
x′i ≥ xi. Thus, the unequal bidding price cannot be an equilibrium.
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Second, two suppliers bid the same positive price, i.e., p1 = p1 = p > 0. Based on Proposition
1, the selling quantities of two suppliers satisfy the following condition∑
i
x∗i (p,y
∗(p,ϕ)) = min(D, y∗1(p, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p, ϕ2)). (44)
For simplicity, we denote the original selling quantity of supplier 1 and supplier 2 as x1 and x2,
respectively when p1 = p1 = p > 0. Then we discuss two cases (i) and (ii).
• (i) When D < y∗1(p, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p, ϕ2), we have
x1 + x2 = D. (45)
In this case, if supplier 1 reduces the price by a small ε1 > 0 to a price p′1 = p − ε1
unilaterally, we have
x′1 , x∗1((p− ε1, p), (y∗1(p− ε1, ϕ1), y∗2(p, ϕ2)) = min {D, y∗1(p− ε1, ϕ1)} . (46)
If supplier 2 reduces the price by a small ε2 > 0 to a price p′2 = p − ε2 unilaterally , we
have
x′2 , x∗2((p, p− ε2), (y∗1(p, ϕ1), y∗2(p− ε2, ϕ2)) = min {D, y∗2(p− ε2, ϕ2)} . (47)




2 = min {D, y∗1(p− ε1, ϕ1)}+ min {D, y∗2(p− ε2, ϕ2)} . (48)
Combining (45) and (48), we see that at least one supplier i can always reduce the price by
a small εi > 0 unilaterally such that the selling quantity increases by
x′i − xi >
1
2
min(D, y∗1(p− ε1, ϕ1), y∗2(p− ε2, ϕ2)).
Since we can choose a sufficiently small εi,∀i = 1, 2, the revenue pii will increase due to
the increased selling quantity x′i − xi (with an upward jumping).
• (ii) When y∗1(p, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p, ϕ2) ≤ D < y∗1(p¯, ϕ1) + y∗2(p¯, ϕ2), we have
x1 + x2 = y
∗
1(p, ϕ1) + y
∗
2(p, ϕ2). (49)
Both suppliers can sell out the bidding quantities completely as follows.
x1 = y
∗




Note that D − y∗2(p, ϕ2) ≥ y∗1(p, ϕ1) = x1. Supplier 1 can always increase his price p
to p′ = p¯ > p unilaterally, and x′1 = min(y
∗
1(p
′, ϕ1), D − y∗2(p, ϕ2)). Since we also have
y∗1(p
′, ϕ1) ≥ y∗1(p, ϕ1) = x1, supplier 1’s obtained demand x′1 at p′ will not decrease, i.e.,
x′i ≥ xi. Thus, the revenue of supplier i after increasing the price will also increase.
In summary, when two suppliers bid the same positive price, one supplier can always deviate
so as to obtain a higher revenue, which shows that the equal positive bidding prices cannot be
pure price equilibrium.
Third, both suppliers bid the price at zero: p1 = p2 = 0. In this case, both suppliers have zero
revenues: piR1 = pi
R
2 = 0. Note that both without-storage suppliers will also bid the zero quantity
y∗i (pi, ϕi) = 0 as shown in Theorem 1. Thus, any supplier i can always set a positive price p
′
i > 0
to obtain the positive demand since the other supplier bid zero quantity. This makes his revenue
piR
′
1 > 0 after increasing the price. There, the pure price strategy p1 = p2 = 0 cannot be the
equilibrium




i (p¯, ϕi) , we have discussed all the three cases of the pure
price strategies but none of them is an equilibrium. Thus, there exists no pure price equilibrium





2) The type S1S0 (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 1): Following the same arguments as in the type S0S0, we can
first prove that when D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi), p1 = p2 = p¯ is a pure price equilibrium and show that





there exists no pure price equilibrium.
3) The type S1S1 (i.e.,
∑
i ϕi = 2): The results have been proved in the paper [17].
In conclusion, we have Proposition 2 proved.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 based on Lemma 1 that has been shown in [17]. However, based
on Lemma 1, deriving the mixed price equilibrium in our model is still not straightforward
compared with [17]. That is because, in [17], supplier’s bidding quantity is upper-bounded by his
deterministic production quantity, while in our model, without-storage supplier’s bidding quantity
is upper-bounded by a function of price. The difference significantly increases the complexity of
the analysis in our work.
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To prove Theorem 2, we will utilize a basic property of mix strategy equilibrium as shown in
Lemma 2 [41]. In Lemma 2, we use piRMi (µi, µ−i,ϕ) to denote the expected revenue of supplier








Lemma 2. piRMi (pi, µ∗−i,ϕ) = piREi (ϕ), for all pi ∈ [l, p¯], where piREi is the equilibrium revenue
[41].
Lemma 2 shows that the equilibrium revenue piREi of supplier i is equal to the expected revenue
when he plays any pure strategy pi in the support, i.e., pi ∈ [l, p¯], against the mixed strategy µ∗−i
of the other supplier at the equilibrium.
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we will characterize the equilibrium revenue piREi as well
as the CDF of the mixed price equilibrium F ei (p) using the lower support l over p ∈ [l, p¯).21 We
make the analysis of the with-storage supplier (i.e., ϕi = 1) and without-storage supplier (i.e.,
ϕi = 0) as follows.
1) With-storage supplier i (i.e., ϕi = 1): For supplier i, based on Lemma 2, the equilibrium
revenue piREi can be characterized by the expected revenue when he plays any pure strategy pi ∈
[l, p¯) against the mixed strategy of supplier −i (with CDF F e−i and PDF f e−i) at the equilibrium
as follows












D −min(y∗−i(p−i, ϕ−i), D),E[Xi]
) · f e−i(p−i)dp−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi>p−i
. (51)
Note that in (51), D −min(y∗−i(p−i, ϕ−i), D) ≤ E[Xi] will always hold for any p−i ∈ [l, p¯], i.e.,
D −min(y∗−i(l, ϕ−i), D) ≤ E[Xi], or
D ≤ E[Xi] + y∗−i(l, ϕ−i). (52)
21Note that F e2 (p) may not be continuous at p = p¯ as indicated in Lemma 1.
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This helps us simplify the second part “pi > p−i" in (51). We can prove this by contradiction as
follows. If D−min(y∗−i(l, ϕ−i), D) > E[Xi], there exists a small ε > 0 such that D−min(y∗−i(l+





−i,ϕ) = l ·min(D,E[Xi]), (53)
and for any ε > 0,
piREi (ϕ) = pi
RM
i (l + ε, µ
∗
−i,ϕ)
= (l + ε) ·min(D,E[Xi])(1− F e−i(l + ε)) + (l + ε)
∫ l+ε
l
E[Xi] · f e−i(p−i)dp−i
= (l + ε) ·min(D,E[Xi])(1− F e−i(l + ε)) + (l + ε) · E[Xi] · F e−i(l + ε)
≥ (l + ε) ·min(D,E[Xi]). (54)
Then, we can see that (53) and (54) contradict with each other, and thus D−min(y∗−i(p−i, ϕ−i), D) ≤
E[Xi] will always hold for p2 ∈ [l, p¯], which enables us to simplify (51).




−i,ϕ) is constant over pi ∈ [l, p¯), the derivative of piRMi (pi, µ∗−i,ϕ)












f e−i(p−i)dp−i + pi
(




Combining (55) with (51), we have the PDF of mixed price strategy at the equilibrium for
without-storage supplier −i’s as follows.
f e−i(p) =
piREi (ϕ)
p2 ·min{y∗−i(p, ϕ−i), D} − p2 · [D − E[Xi]]+
, (56)
which is characterized by the equilibrium revenue piREi of supplier i.
2) Without-storage supplier i (i.e., ϕi = 0): For supplier i without storage, similarly, based on
Lemma 2, the equilibrium revenue piREi (ϕ) can be characterized by the expected revenue when
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he plays any pure strategy pi ∈ [l, p¯) against the mixed strategy of supplier −i (with CDF F e−i)






=piRi (pi,min (D, y
∗
i (pi, ϕi),ϕ)) · (1− F e−i(pi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi≤p−i
+ piRi (pi,min(D −min(E[X−i], D), y∗i (pi, ϕi)),ϕ) · F e−i(pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi>p−i
. (58)
Similarly, we have that D −min(E[X−i], D) ≤ y∗i (pi, ϕi) always holds for any pi ∈ [l, p¯]. Then,
according to (58), we have the PDF of the mixed price strategy at the equilibrium for the with-
storage supplier −i as follows.
F e−i(p) =
piRi (p,min{y∗i (p, ϕi), D},ϕ)− piREi (ϕ)
piRi (p,min{y∗i (p, ϕi), D},ϕ)− piRi (p, [D − E[X−i]]+,ϕ)
, (59)
which is characterized by the equilibrium revenue piREi of supplier i.
In conclusion, if ϕi = 1, we have





piR−i(p,min{y∗−i(p, ϕ−i), D},ϕ)− piR−i(p, (D − E[Xi])+,ϕ)
. (60)
If ϕi = 0, we have




p2 ·min{y∗i (p, ϕi), D} − p2 · (D − E[X−i])+
dp. (61)
for any l ≤ p < p¯.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
To prove Proposition 3, we first show that F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) is always decreasing in l†i ,∀i, based
on which we can prove Proposition 3 (1) by contradiction. Then, we can have Proposition 3 (2)
proved directly from Lemma 1 (iii).
We now prove that F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) is always decreasing with l†i , for both ϕi = 1 and ϕi = 0.
1) With-storage supplier i (i.e, ϕi = 1): For the without-storage supplier i, according to (11),
we have
F ei (p¯





piR−i(p¯,min{y∗−i(p, ϕ−i), D},ϕ)− piR−i(p¯, (D − E[Xi])+,ϕ)
. (62)
Note that the equilibrium revenue function piRE−i (ϕ) (shown in Lemma 1 (iii)) is increasing in
the lower support l†i , and thus F
e
i (p¯
− | l†1) is decreasing in l†i .
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2) Without-storage supplier i (i.e, ϕi = 0): For the without-storage supplier i, according to
(12), we have
F ei (p¯




p2 ·min{y∗i (p, ϕi), D} − p2 · [D − E[Xi]]+
dp. (63)
We take the first-order derivative of F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) with respect to l†i and obtain
∂F ei (p¯






p2 ·min{y∗i (p, ϕi), D} − p2 · (D − E[Xi])+
dp
− min(D,E[Xi])
l†i ·min{y∗i (l†i , ϕi), D} − l†i · (D − E[Xi])+
. (64)
Further, we take the derivative of (64) with respect to l†i again and have
∂2F ei (p¯
















i , ϕi) increases in l
†
i . Thus, we
always have
∂2F ei (p¯
− | l†i )
∂l†i
2 ≥ 0, (66)





is non-decreasing with l†i . Then, we choose l
†
i = p¯ and have
∂F ei (p¯
− | l†i )
∂l†i
= − min(D,E[Xi])
p¯ ·min{y∗i (p¯, ϕi), D} − p¯ · (D − E[Xi])+
< 0,
which holds for all l†i ≤ p¯. The reason is that D < E[Xi]+y∗i (p¯, ϕi) in the subgame S1S0 without
the pure price equilibrium. Therefore, we have that F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) decreases with l†i .
Till now, we have shown that F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) is always decreasing in l†i for both ϕi = 1 and
ϕi = 0. Then, we can prove Proposition 3 (1) by contradiction. According to Lemma 1 (iii),
if F ei (p¯
− | l†i ) = 1 has a solution l†∗i for both suppliers i = 1, 2, either l = max(l†∗1 , l†∗2 ) or
l = min(l†∗1 , l
†∗









and l = l†∗1 . Note that F
e
1 (p¯
− | l†∗1 ) = 1 and hence F e2 (p¯− | l†∗2 ) = 1. Since F e2 (p¯− | l†2) is
decreasing with l†2, then F
e
2 (p¯
− | l†∗1 ) > 1, which is a contradiction of the CDF. Therefore, we
can only choose l = max(l†∗1 , l
†∗
2 ) and we have Proposition 3 (1) proved. Furthermore, according
to Lemma 1 (iii), we have that F ei (p¯
−) = 1 is true for at least one of the suppliers. Thus, if we
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have only one solution of l†i among i = 1 and i = 2, it must be the equilibrium lower support,
which has Proposition 3 (2) proved.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove that piREi > pi
RE
−i always holds for a general distribution for the renewable
generation Xi if ϕi = 1, ϕ−i = 0 and E[Xi] = E[X−i]. Then, we consider the case that X−i
follows a uniform distribution.
1) A general distribution for Xi: We consider the cases of pure price equilibrium and mixed
price equilibrium respectively, and characterize suppliers’ revenue as follows.




p¯min(E[Xi], D), if ϕi = 1,
piRi (p¯,min(D, y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi)),ϕ), if ϕi = 0.
(67)
Note that D ≥ E[Xi] + y∗i (p¯, ϕi) when there is the pure price equilibrium. Therefore, if ϕi = 1
and ϕ−i = 0, we have
piREi (ϕ) = p¯E[Xi]. (68)
























∫ F−1−i ( p¯λ )
0
F−i(x)dx. (73)




) < X¯−i since p¯ < λ.





h′(x) = p− pF−i(x) > 0, (75)
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which shows that h(x) increases in x. Since F−1−i (
p¯
λ
) < X¯−i, according to (73), we have




= p¯E[X−i] ≤ piREi (ϕ). (77)
Based on (68) and (77), if E[X−i] ≤ E[Xi], then we always have
piRE−i (ϕ) < pi
RE
i (ϕ). (78)
(b) The case without pure price equilibrium: The proof procedure is the similar to the case (a)
with pure price equilibrium. The difference is to replace p¯ into the lower support l, i.e.,
piREi (ϕ) =

l ·min(E[Xi], D), if ϕi = 1,
piRi (l,min(D, y
∗
i (l, ϕi)),ϕ), if ϕi = 0.
(79)
We will discuss the following two cases.
• E[Xi] ≤ D: If ϕi = 1 and ϕ−i = 0, we have
piREi (ϕ) = l · E[Xi]. (80)





≤ piR−i(l, y∗−i(l, ϕ−i),ϕ). (82)
We can follow the same argument as in (a) with the pure price equilibrium to show that
piREi > pi
RE
−i if E[Xi] ≥ E[X−i]. The only difference is to replace p¯ by l.
• E[Xi] > D: If ϕi = 1 and ϕ−i = 0, we have
piREi (ϕ) = l ·D. (83)





– If y∗−i(l, ϕ−i) ≤ D, we have





≤ ly∗−i(l, ϕ−i)− l
∫ y∗−i(l,ϕ−i)
0
F−i(x)dx (as in (73)) (86)
< lD (87)
= piREi (ϕ). (88)
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– If y∗−i(l, ϕ−i) > D, we have
piRE−i (ϕ) = pi
R
−i(l, D,ϕ) (89)
= lD − λ
∫ D
0
(D − x)f−i(x)dx (90)
< lD (91)
= piREi (ϕ). (92)
Therefore, for the case (b) without pure price equilibrium, we also have that piREi > pi
RE
−i if
E[Xi] ≥ E[X−i]. Combining case (a) with the pure price equilibrium, for a general distribution
of Xi, we prove that piREi > pi
RE
−i if E[Xi] ≥ E[X−i].
2) Uniform distribution of X−i: We will derive the revenues (at both pure and mixed price
equilibrium) of suppliers under the uniform renewable-generation distribution. For the pure price
equilibrium, it is straightforward to calculate the equilibrium revenue when there is p1 = p2 = p¯
when D ≥ ∑i yi(p¯, ϕi). For the case without pure price equilibrium, i.e., D < ∑i yi(p¯, ϕi),
we will characterize the lower support for the mixed price equilibrium and characterize the
equilibrium revenue based on Theorem 2 and Proposition 3.









According to Theorem 1, the weakly dominant bidding quantity strategy is
y∗i = E[Xi], (94)










Next we discuss the case (a) with pure price equilibrium and the case (b) without pure price
equilibrium respectively.
(a) The case with pure price equilibrium: When D ≥∑i yi(p¯, ϕi), both suppliers’ bid price p¯
and we have
piREi (ϕ) = p¯E[Xi], (96)






















(b) The case without pure price equilibrium: When D <
∑
i yi(p¯, ϕi), based on the character-
ization of CDF in Theorem 2, we discuss the following cases respectively.
• Case of 0 < D ≤ E[Xi]: According to Theorem 2, we have the CDF of the mixed equilibrium
price over p ∈ [l, p¯) as follows:













p2 ·min{y∗−i(p, ϕ−i), D}
dp. (101)
We can see that F ei (p) < 1 over p ∈ [l, p¯) since piRE−i (ϕ) > 0.22 According to Proposition 3,





p2 ·min{y∗−i(p, ϕ−i), D}
dp = 1. (102)
We discuss the following two cases



















We verify that in both cases (1) and (2), min(D, y∗−i(l, ϕ−i)) = y
∗
−i(l, ϕ−i). According to
Lemma 1, the equilibrium revenue of both suppliers will be
piREi (ϕ) = l · (D,E[Xi]) = l ·D, (105)












22Note that piRE−i (ϕ) > 0 since the lower support l > 0.
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Therefore, when 0 < D ≤ E[Xi], we have





– when D = E[Xi] and E[X−i] = X¯−i2 ≤ E[Xi],
piREi (ϕ)
piRE−i (ϕ)
≥ 4 (due to λ/p¯ > 1).
• Case of E[Xi] < D <
∑
i yi(p¯, ϕi): We characterize the revenue ratio between the two
suppliers according to Lemma 1 as follows.
piREi (ϕ) = l ·min(D,E[Xi]) = l · E[Xi], (109)



































Finally, combining (a) and Subsection (b), we have Theorem 3 proved.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
We will discuss the equilibrium revenue with pure price equilibrium and without pure price
equilibrium, respectively.
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1) With the pure price equilibrium (i.e., D ≥∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi): : If ϕi = 1, we have
piREi (ϕ) = p¯E[Xi] > 0. (113)
If ϕi = 0, we have




i (p¯, ϕi),ϕ) (114)
= λ








i (p¯, ϕi): :If ϕi = 1, due to the lower
support l > 0, we have
piREi (ϕ) = lmin(D,E[Xi]) > 0. (117)
If ϕi = 0, due to the lower support l > 0, we have




i (l, ϕi)),ϕ) (118)
> piRi (0,min(D, y
∗
i (0, ϕi)),ϕ) (119)
= 0. (120)
In conclusion, we have Proposition 5 proved.
G. Proof of Proposition 4
We prove Proposition 4 by contradiction.
First, we prove mini y∗i (l, ϕi) < D by contradiction. Suppose that y
∗
i (l, ϕi) ≥ D for both
i = 1, 2 and supplier −i’s mixed strategy F e−i has no atom at p¯ based on Lemma 1 (iii). Then,
against supplier −i’s bidding price p ∈ [l, p¯), according to Proposition 1, supplier i’s selling out
electricity quantity at the price p¯ is
x∗i (p,y) = min
{
D −min{D, y∗−i(p, ϕ−i)} , y∗i (p¯, ϕi)} (121)
=0. (122)
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Thus, the equilibrium revenue of supplier i can be characterized as follows








x∗i (p,y) · f e−i(p−i)dp−i (123)
= 0. (124)
However, at the case of mixed price equilibrium, both suppliers’ equilibrium revenue is strictly
positive as shown in Proposition 5, i.e., piREi (ϕ) > 0, which is contradiction to (124). Therefore,
we have mini y∗i (l, ϕi) < D.
Second, we prove D ≤ ∑i y∗i (l, ϕi) by contradiction. Suppose that D > ∑i y∗i (l, ϕi). Thus,




i (l+ε, ϕi) still holds. Note that mini y
∗
i (l, ϕi) < D
and we assume that y∗−i(l, ϕ−i) < D without loss of generality. We also let this small ε satisfy
y∗−i(l + ε, ϕ−i) < D. We can characterize supplier i’s equilibrium revenue using l and l + ε,
respectively as follows.
(a) With l:







min(D, y∗i (l, ϕi))f
e
−i(p−i)dp−i. (125)
(b) With l + ε:
piREi (ϕ) = pi
RM
i (l + ε, µ
∗
−i,ϕ)
= (l + ε) ·
∫ p¯
l+ε
min(D, y∗i (l + ε, ϕi))f
e
−i(p−i)dp−i





D −min{D, y∗−i(p, ϕ−i)} , y∗i (l + ε, ϕi)} · f e−i(p−i)dp−i
= (l + ε)
∫ p¯
l+ε
min(D, y∗i (l + ε, ϕi))f
e
−i(p−i)dp−i + (l + ε)
∫ l+ε
l













min(D, y∗i (l, ϕi))f
e
−i(p−i)dp−i. (126)
We see that (125) and (126) contradict with each other. Therefore, we have D ≤∑i y∗i (l, ϕi).
In conclusion, we have Proposition 4 proved.
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XVII. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF STAGE I
A. Proof of Theorem 4
We prove Theorem 4 based on Definition 4 for the storage-investment equilibrium. We first
discuss the pure storage-investment equilibrium and then discuss the mixed storage-investment
equilibrium.
First, for the pure price equilibrium, we use the example of the S0S0 case. If the S0S0 case is
an equilibrium, each supplier will not be better off if he deviates to investing in storage, i.e.,
pi
S1S0|Y
i − Ci ≤ piS0S0i , ∀i = 1, 2 (127)
Therefore, Ci ∈ [piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i ,+∞), for both i = 1, 2. Similarly, we can derive the conditions
for the S1S0 case and the S1S1 case to be the equilibrium, respectively.
Second, if there is no pure storage-investment equilibrium, we can always compute the mixed
storage-investment equilibrium [28]. Supplier i invests in the storage with probability prsi and




i = 1. We construct the





i = 1,∀i = 1, 2,
prs−i · (piS1S1i − Ci) + prn−i · (piS1S0|Yi − Ci) = prs−i · piS1S0|Ni + prn−i · piS0S0i ,∀i = 1, 2.
(128)
By solving (128), we can obtain prsi and pr
n
i for both i = 1, 2, which is the mixed storage-
investment equilibrium.
B. Proof of Proposition 6
We prove Proposition 6 based on Theorem 4.
Note that piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i is bounded for both i = 1, 2. Thus, there always exists CS0S0i such
that CS0S0i > pi
S1S0|Y
i − piS0S0i for each i = 1, 2. According to Theorem 4, the S0S0 case will be
the storage-investment equilibrium, which is also unique.
C. Proof of Proposition 7
We prove Proposition 7 based on the storage-investment-equilibrium shown in Theorem 4 and
suppliers’ equilibrium revenue in the case S0S0 shown in Proposition 2. We will show that if the
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demand Dm,t ≤ mini E[Xm,ti ], the condition Ci ∈ [0, piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni ], for both i = 1, 2 cannot be
satisfied.
According to Proposition 2, in the S0S0 case, if the demand Dm,t ≤ mini E[Xm,ti ], then both
suppliers’ revenue is zero. Therefore, if the demand 0 < Dm,t ≤ mini E[Xm,ti ] for any m and t,
we have
piS1S1i = 0,∀i = 1, 2. (129)
However, according to Proposition 5, we have that piS1S0|Ni > 0 always holds. Therefore, if the
demand 0 < Dm,t ≤ E[Xm,ti ] for any m and t, we have
piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni < 0,∀i = 1, 2. (130)
Based on the condition of S1S1 being the equilibrium in Theorem 4, the S1S1 case cannot be a
pure equilibrium if piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni < 0,∀i = 1, 2.
D. Proof of Proposition 8
We will prove Proposition 8 based on Theorem 4. The key is to show piS1S0|Yi − piS0S0i =
piS1S1i − piS1S0|Ni > 0 for both i = 1, 2.
When Dm,t ≥ Dm,t,th = max(∑i ym,t∗i (p¯, 1), ∑i ym,t∗i (p¯, 0)), there exists the pure price
equilibrium p1 = p2 = p¯ for each type of subgame in Stage II according to Proposition 2.







i (p¯, ϕi),ϕ)], where
∑
i
















i (p¯, ϕi),ϕ)], where
∑
i


















, Cthi . (138)
which is based on (132) and (135). Note that Cthi > 0 always holds as implied in (78).
According to Theorem 4, if Ci ≤ Cthi , then supplier i will invest in storage (i.e., ϕ∗i = 1) while
if Ci > Cthi , then supplier i will not invest in storage (i.e., ϕ
∗
i = 0).
E. Proof of Proposition 9
Suppliers always have strictly positive profit at the storage-investment equilibrium because
the without-storage supplier can always have positively revenue in the cases of S1S0 and S0S0
according to Proposition 5. We show it as follows.
• If the S0S0 case is the equilibrium, both suppliers get strictly positive profit (with zero storage
investment cost) according to Proposition 5.
• If the S1S0 case is the equilibrium, the without-storage suppliers get strictly positive profit
(with zero storage investment cost) according to Proposition 5. If the with-storage supplier
gets non-positive profit, he can always deviate to not investing in storage, which leads to
the case S0S0 and brings him strictly positive profit.
• If the S1S1 case is the equilibrium and one supplier gets non-positive profit, he can always
deviate to not investing in storage, which leads to the case S1S0 and brings him strictly
positive profit.
In summary, suppliers always have strictly positive profits at the storage-investment equilibrium.
XVIII. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF OLIGOPOLY MODEL
A. Proof of Proposition 11
This proof can follow the same procedure in the proof of Proposition 2 by verifying the pure
price equilibrium according to the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Towards this end, note
that for supplier i with or without storage, the revenue function piRi (pi, x
∗
i (p,y),ϕ) is strictly
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increasing with respect to both the price pi and the selling quantity x∗i (p,y) that is in the range
[0, y∗i (pi, ϕi)] (without considering the other supplier’s coupled decisions). We will discuss the
three cases, respectively.
1) The case of D ≥ ∑i∈I y∗i (p¯, ϕi): We can prove that when D ≥ ∑i y∗i (p¯, ϕi), pi = p¯ is
a pure price equilibrium . Also, this pure price equilibrium is unique. This proof can follow the
same procedure in the Section XVI.B.1.a. of the proof of Proposition 2. The intuition is that
when the demand is larger than the maximum bidding quantity, if any supplier deviates to a
lower price, his selling quantity cannot be increased, which leads to a lower revenue.
2) The case of D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)−y∗j (p¯, ϕi) for any j ∈ U: We first prove by the definition
of the Nash equilibrium that when D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj) for any j ∈ U , there exists a
pure price equilibrium p∗i = 0 with an equilibrium revenue pi
RE
i = 0, for any i ∈ I. Then, note
that this equilibrium is not unique, but we show that suppliers always get zero revenue at any
equilibrium.
First, we prove the pure price equilibrium p∗i = 0. We assume that p
∗
i = 0,∀i ∈ I. We will
discuss two cases of with-storage supplier and without-storage supplier, respectively.
(a) For a supplier j ∈ U who invests in storage, if he deviates to a higher price p′j > 0, the









 , j ∈ U . (139)
Note that according to Theorem 1, we have y∗k(0, ϕk) = 0,∀k ∈ V . Also, we have y∗k(pk, ϕk) =






y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− yj(p¯, ϕj)), y∗j (p′j, ϕj)
)
, j ∈ U , (140)
which is zero since D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U . Therefore, if this supplier deviates
to a higher price, his revenue will be still zero.
(b) For a supplier j ∈ V who does not invest in storage, if he deviates to a higher price p′j > 0,
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, j ∈ V (142)
which is still zero since D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi). Therefore, if this supplier deviates to a higher price,
his revenue will be still zero. In conclusion, the bidding price p∗i = 0,∀i ∈ I is an equilibrium
where no supplier will deviate.
Second, note that the equilibrium here is not unique, however, each supplier always gets zero
revenue at any equilibrium. We show this by contradiction as follows. If supplier k gets positive
revenue, it means that his bidding price and his obtained demand are both positive. We assume
that a set of suppliers P bid the price p > 0 the same as this supplier k. We denote the set of
suppliers whose prices are lower than p as PL and the set of suppliers whose prices are higher
than p as PH.23 Since this supplier gets positive demand, it means∑
i∈P
y∗i (pi, ϕi) ≤ D −
∑
i∈PL
y∗i (pi, ϕi), (143)
or
0 < D −
∑
i∈PL
y∗i (pi, ϕi) <
∑
i∈P
y∗i (pi, ϕi). (144)
• Case (144) and |P| ≥ 2: At least one of suppliers in P can decrease his price by a sufficiently
positive value, which can increase his obtained demand and increase his revenue. This shows
that this case cannot be one equilibrium.
• Case (144); |P| = 1 and p < p¯: This supplier can increase his price by a small positive
value (which makes the bidding price smaller than the lowest bidding price in set PH⋃ p¯),
which will not decrease his obtained demand. Thus, this deviation increases his revenue and
this case cannot be one equilibrium.
• Case (144); |P| = 1 and p = p¯: Due to (144), we have ∑i∈PL y∗i (pi, ϕi) < D. Note that the
set PL contains all the suppliers except the single supplier k. Thus, there alyways exists
23Note that PL and PH can be both empty sets
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j ∈ U such that ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj) <∑i∈PL y∗i (pi, ϕi) < D, which contradicts the
condition D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U . This case is impossible.
• Case (143) and p < p¯: any supplier in P can always increase his price by a small positive
value (which makes the bidding price smaller than price cap p¯) without decreasing his
obtained demand, which increases his revenue. This shows that this case cannot be one
equilibrium.




i (pi, ϕi) ≤ D, which contradicts the
condition D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U . Thus, this case is impossible.
Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that at any equilibrium, suppliers get zero revenue.
3) The case that there exists j ∈ U such that∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)−y∗j (p¯, ϕj) < D <∑i∈I y∗i (p¯, ϕi):
In this case, there is no pure price equilibrium. This proof can follow the similar procedure in the
Section XVI.B.1.b of the proof of Proposition 2. We can discuss three cases: (i) all the suppliers
bid zero prices; (ii) suppliers’ bidding prices are all equal and positive. (iii) suppliers’ bidding
prices are not equal for all the suppliers. We show that all theses cases cannot be the pure price
equilibrium.




i (p¯, ϕi)−y∗j (p¯, ϕj) < D)
who invests in storage can increase his price, and he will get positive demand. This increases his
revenue and shows that case (i) cannot be an equilibrium.








i (pi, ϕi) >




i (pi, ϕi) ≤ D, any supplier can always
increase his price without decreasing his obtained demand, which increases his revenue. For∑
i∈I y
∗
i (pi, ϕi) > D, at least one supplier can always reduce his price by a sufficiently small
positive value, which can increase his demand and increase his revenue. Thus, case (ii) can not
be an equilibrium.
Third, for case (iii), we denote the set of suppliers with the lowest bidding prices p among all the





i (pi, ϕi) ≤ D, any supplier can always increase his price by a small positive
value (which makes the bidding price smaller than the second lowest price) without decreasing
his obtained demand, which increases his revenue. Thus, this case cannot be an equilibrium. For∑
i∈L y
∗
i (pi, ϕi) > D, there are three possibilities.
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• The lowest price p > 0 and |L |= 1: This supplier can increase his price by a small positive
value (which makes the bidding price smaller than the second lowest bidding price), which
will not decrease his obtained demand. Thus, it increases his revenue and this case cannot
be one equilibrium.
• The lowest price p > 0 and |L |≥ 2: At least one of suppliers in L can decrease his price
by a sufficiently small positive value, which can increase his obtained demand and increase
his revenue. This shows that this case cannot be one equilibrium.




i (0, ϕi) >




i (p¯, ϕi)−maxj y∗j (p¯, ϕi) < D, j ∈ U . We denote
arg maxj∈U y∗j (p¯, ϕj) = j
∗. Thus, there are two possibilities that lead to make this:
– j∗ ∈ L: The supplier j∗ can increase his zero price to a positive price (which is




i (0, ϕi) ≤∑
i∈U y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j∗(p¯, ϕi) < D. This increases supplier j∗’s revenue.
– j∗ /∈ L: Any supplier k in L can increase his zero price to a positive price (which is




i (0, ϕi) <∑
i∈U y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j∗(p¯, ϕi) < D. This increases supplier k’s revenue.
Therefore, the case that the lowest price p = 0 cannot be one equilibrium. Combining the




i (pi, ϕi) > D is not an equilibrium.
Combining cases (i)-(iii), we show that all theses cases cannot the equilibrium. Thus, there
is no pure price equilibrium if there exists j ∈ U such that ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj) < D <∑
i∈I y
∗
i (p¯, ϕi). Finally, we have Proposition 11 proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 12
We first show the existence of mixed price equilibrium and then prove the positive revenues
for all the suppliers in the mixed price equilibrium.
1) Existence of mixed price equilibrium: This result can be derived from Theorem 5 [42].
2) Positive revenue: Note that the case that there exists j ∈ U such that ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) −

















his equilibrium revenue is positive. Then, we prove that other suppliers except supplier n also
have the positive revenues. We denote the support of supplier i’s mixed price strategy as SP i.
First, we will prove that for supplier n, his revenue equilibrium piREn > 0. We prove this by
contradiction. We assume that supplier n’s equilibrium revenue piREn = 0, and discuss two cases.
• For each supplier j 6= n, the support SPj only contains 0, which means each supplier j 6= i
has the pure price strategy pj = 0: Then, for supplier n, he can always set a pure price pn > 0




i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗n(p¯, ϕn) < D,
which contradicts the assumption that piREn = 0.
• In all the suppliers except n, there exists at least one supplier k such that SPk contains
positive price pk > 0: For all the suppliers whose supports contain positive prices (except
n), we denote the set of those suppliers as PS . For any supplier k ∈ PS, we choose
one positive price pk ∈ SPk. Thus, supplier n can always choose a pure price strategy
0 < pn < mink∈PS pk, such that he can get positive demand and positive revenue with a
positive probability. This contradicts the assumption that piREn = 0.
Thus, we can have the conclusion that at the equilibrium, supplier n’s revenue piREn > 0. This
also implies that for supplier n, his support SPn does not contain zero.
Second, we will prove that for any supplier j 6= n, his equilibrium revenue is positive. We
assume that supplier j’s equilibrium revenue piREj = 0. Note that among the suppliers except j,
there exists at least one supplier n such that SPn contains positive price pn > 0. For all the
suppliers (except j) whose supports contain positive prices, we denote the set of those suppliers
as PS ′. For any supplier k ∈ PS ′, we choose one positive price pk ∈ SPk. Thus, supplier j
can always choose a pure price strategy 0 < pj < mink∈PS′ pk, such that he can get positive
demand and positive revenue with a positive probability. Therefore, at the equilibrium, supplier
j’s revenue cannot be zero.
Therefore, based on above discussions, we have that all the suppliers have the positive revenues









C. Proof of Proposition 13
The proof follows the definition of Nash equilibrium.
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It is straightforward that the benefit brought by investing storage for supplier i is bounded.
At the case SU|V , we denote the equilibrium profit of supplier i as Π∗i (SU|V) and the expected
equilibrium revenue (scaled in one hour) over the investment horizon as piREEi (SU|V). For any
case SU|V , one without-storage supplier i has the profit Π∗i (SU|V) = piREEi (SU|V), i ∈ V at the





i|V\i)− Ci. Thus, for i ∈ V , we have
Π∗i (SU
⋃
i|V\i)− Π∗i (SU|V) (145)
=piREEi (SU
⋃
i|V\i)− piREEi (SU|V)− Ci. (146)
Note that piREEi (SU
⋃
i|V\i)−piREEi (SU|V) is bounded for any SU|V . If the storage cost Ci > Cnoi ,




i|V\i)−piREEi (SU|V) over all the cases SU|V , then
this supplier i ∈ V will not deviate to investing in storage in any case of SU|V . Thus, no supplier
investing in storage is the unique equilibrium.
D. Proof of Proposition 14
The proof follows the definition of Nash equilibrium.




i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj)) for any
t and m, each supplier has zero revenue for any t and m as shown in Proposition 11. Thus,
for each supplier i ∈ I, his expected equilibrium revenue piREEi (SU|V) = 0. Then, for supplier
j ∈ U who invests in storage, his profit is piREEi (SU|V) − Ci < 0 since Ci > 0. Therefore, this
supplier i can always deviate to not investing storage which leads to a nonnegative profit. This




i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj)), the case SU|V (i.e., suppliers
of set U investing in storage and suppliers of set V not investing in storage) cannot be a pure
storage-investment equilibrium.
E. Proof of Proposition 15
The intuition of this proposition is that when the demand D is sufficiently large, there is not
competition between suppliers and they make decisions of storage investment independently.
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As implied in Proposition 11, when demand Dm,t ≥∑i∈I ym,t∗i (p¯, ϕi) in subgame SU|V , each
supplier i can bid the price cap p¯ to get his biding quantity ym,t∗i (p¯, ϕi). For convenience, at
hour t of month m, we denote the bidding quantity of supplier i at price cap p¯ in subgame SU|V





i (p¯, ϕi|SU|V) , Dm,t,th′ for any t and m, then each supplier i can
bid the price cap p¯ to get his biding quantity ym,t∗i (p¯, ϕi) in any subgame for any t and m. This
leads to the revenue piR,m,ti (p¯, y
m,t∗
i (p¯, ϕi),ϕ) that can be directly calculated based on supplier
i’s parameter. In this case, we have the following.
• If supplier invests in storage, i.e., ϕi = 1, his equilibrium revenue is





which has been shown in (135).
• If supplier does not invest in storage i.e., ϕi = 0, his equilibrium revenue is




which has been shown in (132).
We compared (147) and (148), and we characterize Cth′i the same as (137) as follows.
Em,t[p¯ym,t∗i (p¯, 1)− λ
∫ ym,t∗i (p¯,0)
0
xfm,ti (x)dx] , Cth
′
i . (149)
F. Proof of Proposition 16
We prove this by contradiction and discuss a total of three cases.
• If one supplier does not invest in storage and gets zero profit (note that a without-storage
supplier always has nonnegative profits), it only means the demand lies in the condition
D ≤ ∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U as shown in Proposition 11 and Proposition 12,
where all the suppliers get zero revenues in the local energy market. This state is not stable
because the with-storage supplier gets negative profit and he can always choose not to invest
in storage, which increases his profit.
• If one supplier invests in storage and gets negative profit, he can always choose not to invest
in storage, which increases his profit. Thus, this case cannot be an equilibrium.
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• If one supplier invests in storage and gets zero profit, it means the demand cannot lie in the
condition D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi)− y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U (otherwise, this supplier will get negative
profit) as shown in Proposition 11 and Proposition 12. This state is not stable since this
supplier can further choose not to invest ins storage, where the demand still cannot satisfy
D ≤∑i∈U y∗i (p¯, ϕi) − y∗j (p¯, ϕj),∀j ∈ U . This leads to a positive revenue, i.e., the positive
profit for this supplier.
In summary, any supplier always has strictly positive profits at the storage-investment equilib-
rium.
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